[Since publications written in Japanese are inaccessible to the rest of the world, I will add English abstracts of my recent works. For short online essays and course materials, see Assorted Index]



For the abstracts of my recent English papers in PhilSci-Archive, visit here: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/view/creators/Uchii=3ASoshichi=3A=3A.html

Sherlock Holmes on Reasoning (in English, 2010) 

The Evolution of Darwin's Evolutionary Thinking (in English, 2009) 

Quantum Gravity and Philosophy (in Japanese, 2007)

An Informational Interpretation of Monadology

Gravitation and Cosmology (in Japanese, 2006)

The Riddle of Space and Time (in Japanese, Chuko Shinsho, 2006)

Tracing Einstein's Ideas---Introduction to the Philosophy of Space and Time (in Japanese, Minerva, Kyoto, Nov., 2004)

Darwin's Principle of Divergence, Online June 8, 2004 (Online essays, also in PhilSci Archive)

The Ethics of Science, Maruzen, 2002

Is Philosophy of Science Alive in the East? A Report from Japan. (March 14, 2002) Center for Philosophy of Science, Anniversary Lecture Series, Univ. of Pittsburgh.

The Structure of Adaptationism, Kagaku-tetugaku (Philosophy of Science) 34-2, 2001. Japanese draft (not the final version)

Notes on Mayo's Notion of Severity, Online, July 3, 2001 (also in PhilSci Archive) Full text

St. Petersburg Paradox [Japanese], in Paradoxes!, edited by S. Hayashi, Nihon Hyoron-sha, June 2000 [ English abridged version]

A Note on Reductionism, Online, Nov. 16, 1999

From the Origin of Morality to the Evolutionary Ethics, part II: Reductionism in the Normative Ethics, continued, Tetsugaku-kenkyu No.569, 2000 Full text (Japanese)

Theory Reduction: the case of the kinetic theory of gases (1-11, online essay), March 1. 1999. http://www1.kcn.ne.jp/~h-uchii/reduction1.html

Darwin on the Evolution of Morality, in "Three Essays on Ethics", Memoir of the Faculty of Letters 38, Kyoto University, 1999. Also online essay, http://www1.kcn.ne.jp/~h-uchii/D.onM.html

The Responsibility of the Scientist, Physics Education in University (The Physical Society of Japan), 1998-3, pp.4-8. Revised text [Japanese]; English text.

From the Origin of Morality to the Evolutionary Ethics, part II: Reductionism in the Normative Ethics, Tetsugaku-kenkyu No.567, 1999. Full text (Japanese)

Utility and Preferences (online essay),

http://www1.kcn.ne.jp/~h-uchii/util%26pref.E.html, October 29, 1998; printed version, in "Three Essays on Ethics", Memoir of the Faculty of Letters 38, Kyoto University, 1999.

Sidgwick's Three Principles and Hare's Universalizability (online essay), http://www1.kcn.ne.jp/~h-uchii/sidg%26hare_index.html, July 22, 1998; printed version, in "Three Essays on Ethics", Memoir of the Faculty of Letters 38, Kyoto University, 1999.

Sherlock Holmes and Probabilistic Induction (online essay), http://www1.kcn.ne.jp/~h-uchii/Holmes/index.html, June 21, 1998

From the Origin of Morality to the Evolutionary Ethics, part I: Reductionism in the Descriptive Ethics, Tetsugaku-kenkyu No.566, October 1998. Full text (Japanese)

Darwinism and Ethics, Seibutsu-kagaku 50-2, September 1998. Full text (Japanese)

Expository Essay: Laplace and the Philosophy of Probability, Philosophical Essay on Probabilities (Japanese translation by S.Uchii), Iwanami, 1997
The Origins of Morality, Science Journal Kagaku 67-4, 1997
Ethics and Theories of Evolution, Sekaishiso-sha, 1996, links to a pdf version added New
Chaos, Complexity, and Methodology, Journal of the Philosophy of Science Society, Japan, 28, 1995
The Probabilistic Revolution, or the Penetration of Probabilistic Ideas into Science, Arche 3, 1995
Introduction to Philosophy of Science---Methods of Science, Aims of Science, Sekaishiso-sha, 1995
British Philosophers on Scientific Explanation in the 19th Century, Journal of the Philosophy of Science Society, Japan, 26, 1993
Darwin and Wallace on the The Principle of Divergence, Memoir of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, 32, 1993

Sherlock Holmes on Reasoning

In this paper, I will show that Sherlock Holmes was a good logician, according to the standard of the 19th century, both in his character and knowledge (sections 2 and 3). Holmes, in all probability, knew William Stanley Jevonsf clarification of deductive reasoning in terms of glogical alphabetsh (section 4).
And in view of his use of ganalytic-synthetich distinction and ganalytic reasoning,h I will argue that Holmes knew rather well philosophy too, as far as logic and methodology are concerned (section 5). Further, I have argued that Holmes introduced new twists (presumably, following Jevons) into analytic reasoning: application to reasoning as regards causal sequences, and probabilistic elimination of hypotheses (sections 6 and 7).
Also, in this context, I will clarify the significance of Holmesf metaphor of the glittle attich: without fine assortment in your brain, it is hard to devise promising hypotheses (section 8).
Finally, presenting a simple model of probabilistic inference, which became prevalent in the 19th century (section 9), I claim that the essence of Holmesf reasoning consists of probabilistic inferences, gbalance probabilities and choose the most likely,h which is nothing but probabilistic elimination of hypotheses in the light of evidence. I also argue that my claim fits in well with the text of Holmes stories (section 10).

See Full Text in pdf. (English)

The Evolution of Darwin's Evolutionary Thinking

(1) Darwin inherited Lyellfs methodology and applied it to the animate beings. This led him, eventually, to the principle of natural selection. This principle enabled him to expel God from biology.
(2) Darwin diverged from Lyell on Man and Morality, presumably because of his experience in Tierra del Fuego. This led him to the thesis of continuity of man and animals, and he noticed the function of morality.
(3) The process of Darwinfs theory construction may be likened to gradual evolution. Each element of his theory, by itself, is not revolutionary. But
taken together and combined, these elements produced a revolutionary change.

See Full Text in pdf. (English)

Quantum Gravity and Philosophy

Current studies on quantum gravity raise some important philosophical questions, and I wish to discuss in this paper a few of them which may be understood without much technical knowledge. As I understand, the trends of such studies can be divided into two groups, (1) extensive or expansive approach and (2) intensive or thrifty approach. The former assumes a rich external frame (background) such as higher-dimensional spacetime, together with the principle of supersymmetry; whereas the latter tries to dispense with any such external frame, and aims at background independent theories. Superstring theories and 5 dimensional warped spacetime (by Lisa Randall etc.) belong to (1), and loop quantum gravity belongs to (2). This contrast may be regarded as a newer version of the old confrontation between Newton and Leibniz; for Newton assumed absolute space and time for his mechanics, whereas Leibniz argued space and time can be reconstructed as a relation among the things governed by the ultimate law given by God. Now, what are the major differences between (1) and (2), and how do they touch on philosophical issues? In terms of the semantic approach to scientific theories, (1), with the rich resources of the frame and supersymmetry, produces rich structures including inflated ontology (various branes and various unknown particles, together with rich possibilities of multi universes not accessible from our universe). Thus it seems its strong assumptions bring about a trade-off between rich results and experimental verifiability. On the other hand, (2) cannot unify physics without assistance of other theories, such as the standard model of the particles, but it can dispense with any external frame and extravagant ontology. As Lee Smolin emphasizes, we can obtain physical information only in this universe, not from other universes. And as the holographic principle suggests, it may be even the case that all the information of this universe can be reduced to two-dimensional surfaces. A discussion of scientific ontology and scientific realism concludes the paper.

See Full Text pdf (in Japanese, in wvzx35-16A 152-165)

An Informational Interpretation of Monadology (presentation made at PSSJ 2006, Hokudai; also at Beijin, LMPS. C. Glymour, W. Wei, and D. Westerstahl, eds., Logic, Methodology and Phil. Sci., College Publications, 2009, pp. 344-353.)

In this paper, I will try to exploit the implication of Leibniz's statement in Monadology (1714) that "there is a kind of self-sufficiency which makes them [monads] sources of their own internal actions, or incorporeal automata, as it were" (Monadology, sect.18). Leibniz's monads are simple substances, with no shape, no magnitude; but they are supposed to produce the phenomena resulting from their activities, which for us humans look as the whole world, the nature. The activities of a monad are characterized by mental terms, perceptions (internal states) and appetites (which change the internal state). By means of perceptions, a monad becomes a "perpetual living mirror of the universe"; it can receive the information of other monads and it can send its own, in turn, to others. The communication and interconnection thus produced result in the physical and the psychical phenomena observed by us, humans.

According to Leibniz, all monads are governed by the teleological law given by the God, and the world of phenomena are governed by the causal and mechanical law. However, there is no inconsistency between these two aspects, since there is a pre-established harmony among the monads; so Leibniz asserts. Now, can this scenario of Leibniz be defended? I will propose the Informatic Interpretation of Monadology, which regards the monads as an automaton governed by the God's program and arranged appropriately; and I will argue that Leibniz's scenario can be defended in terms of this Informatic Interpretation. The crucial part of this interpretation is that the God's program and the monads' activities are related with the phenomenal world by means of a coding (by God, of course). The program is certainly teleological, as you can easily see in terms of a program for a Turing machine. For example, a program for computing the successor function is composed for a definite purpose. But for realizing this computation in terms of a physical device, there must be a causal process (electronic process, e.g.), which physically brings about the coded result. Thus a program and a causal process are not only compatible but also closely united for any designer of a computational device (computer). Likewise, since Leibniz regards the God as the designer of the whole world (both at the reality level and the phenomenal level), it is quite natural for Him to demand a pre-established harmony between the reality (and the teleological law for the monads) and the phenomena (and the causal and mechanical law). The pre-established harmony may be regarded as a rational demand for the God, as the designer of the whole world, and given an appropriate coding (so that a phenomenon is a coded message of some of the monads' activities), He should be able to realize it.

This Interpretation is also defended on the textual basis, with a special reference to Leibniz's distinction between primitive and derivative forces. Drawing on R. M. Adams's careful reading of Leibniz's texts (Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, 1994), I will argue that his rendering is quite in conformity with my interpretation, although he does not seem to be aware of the notion of coding.

See this, which includes a Powerpoint presentation. Full Text.

Gravitation and Cosmology: from the Einstein-de Sitter controversy to the expanding universe

Einstein began the relativistic cosmology by his 1917 paper. But what is his most important contribution to the cosmology?  I will argue that the answer is that he changed the notion of gravity so as to imply both the attractive and the repulsive force. Beginning with the elements of the general relativity, I will briefly review de Sitterfs objection against Einsteinfs spherical universe, Lemai^trefs and Eddingtonfs works, the classic version of the expanding universe, the big-bang cosmology, and the inflationary cosmology. The seminal ideas emerged from the Einstein-de Sitter controversy culminated in the fruitful results of the inflationary cosmology, and the key idea was the gravity as a repulsive force.

See Full Text.

The Riddle of Space and Time (abstract)

Chapter 1. What's Space, What's Time?
Chapter 2. Newton and Leibniz: What did they fight for?
Chapter 3. From Newton's Bucket to the Theories of Relativity
Chapter 4. Whereabouts of the Machian Mechanics
Chapter 5. Cosmos and Quantum

What is space, and what is time? This question has been one of the biggest problems the humans have ever speculated on. Usually, both space and time are presupposed when we consider any events in this world. But if you begin to ask "what's space, what's time?", it is quite hard to find even a clue to answering this question. However, thanks to the development of physics, mechanics in particular, we can notice a close relationship between this question and the laws of mechanics.

I will begin with the classic controversy between Leibniz and Clarke (chapter 2). Clarke and Newton himself defended the view that space and time are absolute, independent of the matter in the universe; the universe was created in space and time, according to their view. Against this, Leibniz propounded the relationalist view that space and time are relations between things or events; thus matter comes first, and space and time are ideal things dependent on the matter. If the God created the world (matter) with sufficient reasons, there is no need for explaining the origin of space and time. Various aspects of this classic controversy can be interpreted in terms of modern physics and cosmology, and that way we can draw valuable instructions for philosophizing on space and time. So let us keep Leibniz's words in mind: "why things are as they are and not otherwise?" By starting from the Leibniz-Clarke controversy, we can also see how difficult the question of space and time is, and that the Leibnizian ideas of relationalism needed a longer time, than Leibniz imagined, for producing significant results. As I see it, the fight between Newton and Leibniz was basically the collision between the two alternative views of science, (1) the view that science should utilize, at least provisionally, any suppositions necessary for solving problems at hand, and (2) the view that science should aim at the ultimate, complete theory for solving all problems. Newton chose (1), and contributed to solving various mechanical problems, although he could not explain the descent of space and time. Whereas Leibiniz insisted on (2), and although he could not construct mechanics based on his relationalism, he could sketch how space and time should arise from the laws of mechanics.

The most striking difficulty for the Leibnizian relationalism is the problem of centrifugal force arising from the supposed absolute rotation. So, in chapter 3, I will trace this problem, from Newton's bucket experiment, Euler, Mach, and up to the two relativity theories. What is the upshot of the long discussion by various people on this problem? According to general relativity, Newton was right, after all, since in the universe even devoid of matter except for the spinning bucket with water, the surface of the water should become concave because of the force arising from the rotation. However, as it turned out, Mach was also right. If the bucket remained still and the rest of the universe rotated around the bucket, the water should also become concave, according to general relativity. This is due to the so-called "frame-dragging" effect; so, although this allows absolute rotation, Mach's conjecture was vindicated that the force arises from the relative rotation between the bucket and the rest of the universe. This problem illustrates well how hard the basic question of space and time is, since it took a long time to come to this conclusion.

Still, the question of the Leibnizian relationalism is not settled. Mach and Poincare gave new twists, and several physicists pursued the question, although their works have been largely neglected because of the great impact of the relativity theories. In chapter 4, I will follow the results of the Leibnizian and Machian relationalism up to the contemporary representatives, notably Julian Barbour. Shroedinger, for instance, obtained interesting results in 1925, but such works have been neglected until the 1990s. Barbour and Bertotti rediscovered essentially the same results around 1980, and noticing a grave difficulty, propounded another approach extendible to general relativity. Its virtue is that we can develop a viable mechanics in terms of relative configurations of objects, without presupposing external frame and time. And Barbour has argued that general relativity was in fact a theory fulfilling the requirements proposed by Leibniz, Mach, and Poincare.

In the final chapter 5, I will get into the contemporary cosmology. But even in this field, some historical knowledge is quite useful. Einstein began the relativistic cosmology in order to fulfill what he regarded as the Machian epistemological virtues. The field equations he found for general relativity needed boundary conditions for obtaining solutions; but such boundary conditions may bring in undesirable ingredients. That is, even if the equations themselves are generally covariant (do not depend on frames chosen), solutions with some boundary conditions are not generally covariant. In particular, the inertial structure of the universe may well depend on such boundary conditions, and the description of the universe may depend on some conditions external to the universe itself! This is certainly against Mach's requirements and Leibnizian dictum. In order to avoid this difficulty, Einstein thought his cylindric universe (spherical in spatial dimensions) is both epistemologically and empirically desirable. However, this solution needed an emendation of the field equations: introduction of the cosmological constant, which expresses a repulsive force contained in the whole universe. De Sitter raised a forceful objection against this idea, and he showed that another solution without matter can be obtained for the emended equations: de Sitter universe. De Sitter derived a red-shift in his theoretical model of the universe. Hubble's discovery was made, at least indirectly, on this basis, and the campaign for the expanding universe was begun later (by Lemaitre, Eddington, and others).

Thus, in a sense, the Einstein-de Sitter controversy paved the way for the idea of the expanding universe; and more importantly, it extended the notion of gravity itself. For, repulsive force as well as attractive force arises according to the same field equations, and this means gravity can include both attractive force and repulsive force! De Sitter universe was initially regarded as static, but as it turned out, in a dynamical frame, it can be regarded as an expanding universe, and exponentially expanding for that! I will briefly review the pivotal moves of the relativistic cosmology, from Friedmann universe, Bigbang theory, to the inflationary universe. But we have to know essentials of the physics of elementary particles, especially grand unified theories (which aim at unifying electric force and the two nuclear forces). The inflation is supposed to occur at the earliest stage of the universe, when the force of nature is going to be divided into four. And what strikes us most is that de Sitter universe reappears in Guth's monumental paper of 1981; but the inflationary burst is due, not to the cosmological constant but to the repulsive force produced by the negative pressure of the false vacuum of the early universe. If we understand the scenario of the inflationary universe, we can see how a vast universe is possible with the total balance of the energy being zero! And we can also see that the Leibnizian pursuit of sufficient reason has been the driving force of the recent cosmology. Although the riddle of space and time has not been solved yet, we can see clearly that a philosophical principle has been working deep in the core of physics and cosmology.

Tracing Einstein's Ideas---Introduction to the Philosophy of Space and Time (in Japanese, Minerva, Kyoto, 2004)

First, I will examine how Einstein succeeded in constructing General Theory of Relativity, i.e. his theory of gravity, starting from his easier theory of Special Relativity (its exposition is also included; ch. 1). In particular, I will examine in detail all of the following steps, with particular emphasis on the conceptual aspects of Einstein's struggles: (1) Equivalence principle enabled him to draw some important conclusions as regards gravitational fields: delay of clock, deflection of light, and the change of the velocity of light (ch. 2). (2) Considerations of a rotating system led him to recognize space warps as well as time warps, and he realized the need for non-Euclidean geometry (ch. 3). (3) Collaboration with Grossmann was fruitful, but some mistakes and misunderstandings prevented them from obtaining the right form of the equation for gravitational fields, i.e. the generally covariant formulation (ch. 3). And worse still, (4) Einstein came to believe that, because of the "hole argument", it is impossible to fulfill the requirement of general covariance (ch. 4). Then, finally, (5) he overcame this difficulty two years later, and obtained the field equation, together with the solution of the perihelion of Mercury (ch. 4).

However, the examination so far is not sufficient for giving the general reader any good view of the general relativity; because his/her understanding must be tested in terms of more concrete examples. For this purpose, I will go through Schwarzschild geometry and related matters. The gravitational field around a static star, as well as a black hole, is described by this geometry, and the conceptual problems Einstein encountered can be nicely illustrated in terms of this specific example. Also, I will briefly sketch a journey across the horizon of a black hole, since this can give another good example of conceptual problems generated by general relativity (ch. 5).

Then with this much of knowledge of the two theories of relativity, we can examine the controversy between the absolutism and the relationalism in the philosophy of space and time. Why did Newton introduce absolute space and time? What was the point of Leibniz' objections against Newton? And how should we interpret Mach's famous objection against Newton with respect to the definition of mass and the argument for absolute space and time based on the bucket experiment? Mach proposed an alternative way to construct mechanics, starting from relative distances among the particles constituting the world. Poincare also denounced absolute space and time, but he at the same time pointed out the grave difficulty of the mechanics based on the Machian ideas. Einstein says he was influenced by Mach's ideas, but many recent writers, Michael Friedman, in particular, criticize Einstein's argument for the "general principle of relativity", and the connection between this principle and Mach's ideas may be questioned.

Thus I wish to pursue, as the main theme of the final chapter (ch. 6), the possibility of the relationalism, and the possibility of the Machian mechanics on the basis of the relative data for any given mechanical system. As Mach and Poincare succinctly pointed out, the Machian mechanics must be applied to the whole system, not to any subsystem of the whole; otherwise quite silly consequences follow, as we can easily see. But Friedman's criticism of Einstein overlooked this essential point. On the other hand, Julian Barbour seems to have succeeded in constructing the Machian mechanics, both for classical and relativistic versions. With a brief description of Barbour's attempt, I will give a prospect of further studies in this field. Throughout the book, many illustrations (129 figures by the author) are provided in order to help the reader's understanding.

Chapter 1  From Classical Mechanics to Special Relativity

1. The same relative motion, different explanations / 2. Galilean relativity / 3. Why disturbing? / 4. Einstein's proposal / 5. Space and time in classical mechanics / 6. Objections against absolute space and time / 7. Einstein's reconstruction of classical space and time / 8. Treatment in special relativity / 9. Simultaneous at different places? /10. Relativity of simultaneity / 11. Relativity of spatial distance / 12. Lorentz transformation / 13. Composition of velocities / 14. How in electromagnetism? / 15. Minkowski space / 16. Lorentz geometry / 17. From my coordinate system? / 18. Invariance of interval / 19. Coordinate systems and geometry / 20. Four-dimensional Minkowski space / 21. The twin paradox and natural motions / 22. Energy, momentum, and mass

Chapter 2  Led by the Equivalence Principle

23. Why special relativity insufficient? / 24. How to treat gravity / 25. Gravitational Fields / 26. Inertial mass and gravitational mass / 27. Equivalence principle / 28. How to use equivalence principle / 29. The beginning of confusion? / 30. 1907 paper / 31. Clocks in different locations of a gravitational field / 32. Einstein's reasoning reconstructed in Minkowski space / 33. Light bends in a gravitational field / 34. 1911 paper / 35. Light changes velocity in a gravitational field / 36. Deflection of light around the sun / 37. What we can learn from a uniform gravitational field / 38. Coordinate transformation without change of laws

Chapter 3  Time Warps, Space Warps

39. A rotating system / 40. Gauss' theory of curved surface / 41. Invariant quantities / 42. Curvature is not relative / 43. Reformulation of the general principle of relativity / 44. 1913 Entwurf / 45. Error on static gravitational fields

Chapter 4  The Riddle of the Hole

46. General covariance cannot hold for field equations? / 47. The hole argument / 48. Escape from the hole / 49. Letters to Ehrenfest / 50. Perihelion of Mercury / 51. Gravitational Field around the sun / 52. The equation for gravitational fields

Chapter 5  Schwarzschild Geometry and the Black Hole

53. The gravitational field within the earth / 54. Setting the Schwarzschild coordinates around a star / 55. Schwarzschild geometry / 56. Space warps in a gravitational field / 57. Black Hole / 58. Properties of the Schwarzschild coordinates / 59. Approaching the horizon / 60. Approaching the black hole beyond the horizon

Chapter 6  Ready for the Philosophy of Space and Time

61. Newton's bucket / 62. Mach's criticism of Newton / 63. An operational and kinematical definition of mass / 64. Criticism of absolute rotation / 65. How to interpret the law of inertia / 66. Poincare's contributions / 67. Einstein's impact / 68. What is general covariance? 69. Einstein's greatest contribution / 70. Has the Machian  relativistic mechanics failed? / 71. A reconstruction of classical mechanics along Mach's line / 72. The two conditions for the Machian mechanics / 73. Intrinsic difference and geodesics in a relative configuration space / 74. General relativity from the Machian point of view / 75. Reconstructing time from changes / 76. Final remarks

See Spacetime 2004 (figures in full color provided in PDF)

Darwin's Principle of Divergence, 2004

Darwin's famous book, On the Origin of Species is not an easy book for the reader. Especially, the central part of his doctrine addressing to the problem of how a small difference between varieties of a single species may become larger and larger and become a large difference between two distinct species or between two genera etc. is often confusing. Darwin brings in the "principle of divergence", in order to answer this central question, but the problem is: what is the status of this principle of divergence? Is it an independent principle from that of natural selection? How does it work, and how, exactly, does Darwin explain the diversification of organic beings? In this paper, I will give a logical analysis of Darwin's whole reasoning on this problem, based on the text of On the Origin of Species as well as as of the Big Species Book.

See Full text

The Ethics of Science, Maruzen, 2002

Why should we discuss the "ethics of science"? Some recent popular view may tell you that, "since science is a social product, just as social institutions, laws, cultures and artistic pieces are, and since any social activity involves morals, you cannot avoid the question of ethics in science too". Such answers as this may look reasonable, but hardly have any substantive content. For, we ask not only "why ethics?" but also "why science?"; thus if you wish to discuss the "ethics of science", you've got to get into the content of science, and you've got to begin there.

As a first approximation, science is regarded as some sort of systematic activities for fulfilling our curiosity, "we wish to know this"; at this stage, we may disregard the question of the use of such knowledge. Thus, confining our attention to science proper in this sense, I will begin from the problem of priority of scientific discovery. My view is that the ethics of science begins from the question of priority, the rules for claiming priority; scientists, as persons participating in such activities of knowing, their priority in view, have to conform to other rules, more specific and related to ("derived", in some sense, from) the rules for priority, and I will call such subsidiary rules, the "ethics for the scientists".

I am not primarily concerned with the ethics in abstract; I wish to discuss the ethics at work in specific situations involving scientific activities. For this, we have to look at many specific cases of scientific investigation, and thus we have got to pay enough attentions to the manner how scientific investigations are conducted; and my stance in this regard may be one of the characteristic features of this book. Further, although I am not a member of any professional associations for ethics, I have good experiences both in teaching ethics and writing on ethics; I was a professor of ethics at two different institutions. Thus, although I will refrain from lecturing on ethics in this book, I will try to present substantive and authentic arguments for the ethics of science, which are meant to be unlike many recent pieces of work in "applied ethics" which became quite fashionable in Japan. I should be pleased if the reader can recognize the difference between such pieces and my own work.

Sample chapters [Japanese]

Is Philosophy of Science Alive in Japan?

Do you know the Japanese equivalent for "philosophy"? That word, "tetsugaku", was coined after the Meiji Revolution (1868). Do you know when the philosophy of science, the logical empiricism, was introduced into Japan? After the World War II, around 1950. Do you know whether or not the philosophy of science, especially its "hardcore", is studied seriously in Japan? Very few people are studying the philosophy of space and time, the philosophy of quantum mechanics, the philosophy of evolution, the philosophy of probability, or the philosophy of social sciences. Do you know how many HPS departments exist in Japan? Only three, one is founded in 1951 and its graduate program was extended in 1970, and the other two were founded around 1993. Now, with these preparations, you are beginning to understand what I am going to talk about---Is Philosophy of Science alive in Japan? I will briefly outline the history of the philosophy of science in Japan, and discuss some of its peculiarities. And from this discussion, I wish to point out what is needed for the philosophy of science in Japan.

1. Three Basic Facts

2. Taketani's Doctrine of the Three Stages

3. Logical Empiricism in Japan

4. The Relationship between Philosophers and Scientists in Japan

5. Japanese Followers of the "New" Philosophy of Science

6. What is needed for the Philosophy of Science in Japan?

See Full Text

The Structure of Adaptationism

As is well known, Tooby and Cosmides argued that the evolutionary point of view is indispensable in the social sciences; they criticized the standard social science model (SSSM), and proposed instead the integrated causal model (ICM) based on the evolutionary psychology. Since their proposal adopts the adaptationism, I wish to analyze the structure of the adaptationism, examining some of their key words: adaptation, function, and module. Since the adaptationism was severely criticized by Gould and Lewontin, I wish also to examine how well it can overcome such criticisms. This review will serve as an introduction to the philosophical consideration on the relevance of the evolutionary theory to the theories of mind and society.

Notes on Mayo's Notion of Severity

Deborah Mayo propounded the epistemology of experiment in her Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge (1996), and the notion of severity plays an essential role in her epistemolgy. In the following two notes, I wish to point out a defect of her definition of severity, and to argue that she must revise this definition in conformity with what she actually does in her book (Note 1). The revision has some important consequence: in order to apply Mayo's severity consideration to experimental tests, we have to know all alternative hypotheses, in a given experimental situation, in advance. Mayo does not seem to recognize this, and her analysis of Perrin's experiment seems to be affected by this defect. I will present what I regard as the correct way to reconstruct Perrin's argument (Note 2).

From the Origin of Morality to the Evolutionary Ethics, part II: Reductionism in the Normative Ethics, continued, Tetsugaku-kenkyu No.569, 2000.

This issue will conclude part II and the whole paper.

My reductionistic program in the normative ethics aims at constructing "the morality as it ought to be" on the basis of rational choices. Its basic idea can be stated as follows: The morality as we actually have is not necessarily systematic; it is a bunch of norms, duties, and values which may sometimes collide with each other; and personal preferences are often biased and therefore may lead to differences of moral preferences and moral judgments. However, if we consider on the basis of rational preferences, not on actual preferences, such biases and differences may be removed to a considerable degree, and systematization of norms and values may become possible. The morality as it ought to be is the one which can be justified, in the sense that it can be accepted, on such a rational basis. Thus if we can use the notion of rationality that does not presuppose morality, reductionism can be maintained.

However, rationality has many interpretations, the most serious difference being between (1) rationality with full information and (2) rationality with limited information and capacity. It is well known that Herbert Simon drew our attention to this distinction, and he emphasized the importance of (2), which he named "bounded rationality", and in which "satisficing" principle replaces "maximizing" principle in (1). Thus the first task for us is to examine this distinction and see whether there is a possibility for conciliating the two. On my diagnosis, although models of bounded rationality are far more successful as a means for describing our actual decisions, the significance of the maximization principle reappears if we try to improve bounded rationality or its decisions, and to look for a systematization of such decisions which may often be incoherent, fragmentary, or ad hoc. Simon himself admits that "satisficing" process can be transformed into "maximization" process if we allow extended framework and extra cost for calculation. Thus my proposal is that we allow improvement of rationality, although we always stick to the condition of "boundedness" of our rationality; maximization principle then works at the level of improvement, prescribing to choose a better alternative between any two available at that level. However, such improvement is always local, as is the case with evolution by natural selection; but that is all we can do as a finite being.

I will illustrate the significance of my proposal in terms of my criticism of Dennett's "moral first aid", which is his version of the defence of bounded rationality in morals. Since we stick to the condition of boundedness, his criticism against high-minded ethics is well taken. But as long as we are committed to improvement in moral matters, as Dennett himself seems to be committed to, the significance of maximization is revived. We should aim at maximization via local improvement, although there is no guarantee of realizing global maximization.

Now, in order to reconstruct normative ethics on this basis of bounded-but-improvable rationality, we turn our attention to "the universalizability of moral judgment" and "the fair treatment of everyone's good" (these are two of the most crucial conditions for traditional morality). How can our reductionist program derive these normative conditions or their near-equivalents?

As I see it, the universalizability can be accepted as our rationality is improved in social life. Morality is a form of "reciprocal altruisim" as discussed in recent evolutionary biology. But this reciprocity does not demand strict universality, only reciprocity within the group to which one belongs. However, this in-group reciprocity has a room for improvement, as long as there may be a possibility for gaining more by extending social intercourse beyond the group: it has its own "opportunity cost". Thus by extending our social relationships beyond the group, we can obtain a greater benefit; but for that, we have to extend the scope of moral consideration and this elicits "more" universalizability, and this in turn demands an improvement of our rationality (extending our knowledge, consideration, and caluculation a bit further).

This speculation can be supported by recent empirical investigations by T. Yamagishi. He focused on the notion of "trust", as contrasted with "committment", and its role in our social life under uncertainty. He argues that while "committment"-relation is a means for responding to social uncertainty by in-group favoritism, "trust"-relation is another means in terms of extending our relationships to new partners. And he argues that "trust" can be developed where both social uncertainty and opportunity cost are high, because there are possibilities for obtaining a greater benefit by trusting others under such conditions. He also argues that one needs higher "social intelligence" in order to utilize this "trust"-relation. Thus, although his subject is more concrete and specific than our problem of universalizability, we can apply his scenario to our case, and I point out that the development of "social intelligence" is an important factor for imporoving our bounded rationality.

We can also apply the same idea to "the fair treatment of everyone's good", which is a more important and substantive condition for morality. The point can be illustrated in terms of the incident of "Enola Gay" exhibit at the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum in 1995. In order to give a fair consideration for everyone's good (that is, "everyone" involved in a given case), we have to give an appropriate weight to everyone's good, in addition to universalizing our consideration; and how should we do this? In order to assess the significance of the two atomic bombs exploded on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we have to give an appropriate weight to a Japanese life and an American soldier's life, among many other factors (such as the escalation of "strategic bombing" or the post-war armament race between US and USSR) involved in the case; but how should we do this? You can stick to your prejudice (e.g. the myth of "a million lives saved by the bombs"), or you may give a very small weight to 210,000 lives lost in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (by the end of 1945). But a far better alternative is to examine the relevant facts involved (as the Smithsonian staff tried to do), to represent the victims's sufferings as well as American soldiers's agony (thus appealing to our imagination and sympathy), and so on so forth, and then, in light of all this, to decide your opinion. Such a decision is made in the light of improved rationality. And don't say it is impossible for bounded rationality; the Smithsonian staff provided many good materials by their long labor, and that's a way to improve bounded rationality. And we can expect a greater benefit by going out of in-favoritism and exclusive consideration.

Of course there is a hard question of "interpersonal comparison" of good or preference. For this, I propose a conventionalism coupled with revision in light of improved rationality: initial weights given to different people's good may be conventionally chosen by each individual, but they can be revised in light of improved rationality. The interpersonal comparison can be made possible by a convention, and if it is unacceptable to many people, it can be changed and hopefully improved, by means of mutual criticism and in light of improved rationality; thus my approach is evolutionary to this extent. A summary and a prospect of reductionism conclude the paper.

21 Rationality---maximization or satisficing?

22 Optimization in evolution

23 Is maximization model unnecessary?

24 Dennett's "moral first aid"

25 Universalizability and rationality

26 Committment and trust

27 Trust and social intelligence

28 Suggestions to universalizability

29 Universalization and weighing of good

30 Weighing of good and social intelligence

31 Conventionalism for the comparison and weighing of good

32 Evolutionary ethics and reductionism, a summary and a prospect

Full text (Japanese)

Darwin on the Evolution of Morality

Darwin argued for the biological basis of morality in his Descent of Man (1871). Beginning with the thesis of the continuity of man and animals, he tried to explain the origin of the moral sense, or conscience, as understood as an ability to discern right and wrong, and to feel guilty if one realizes to have done wrong. His argument is that, in any animal with social instincts and sufficient intellectual powers, a moral sense would be developed. Although Darwin's argument had some missing links, I try to show that his argument can be consistently reconstructed, in view of recent development of the evolutionary biology and behavioral ecology. As I understand, Darwin's basic tenet is reductionism via evolutionary processes (natural selection, in particular): morality can be reduced to a combination of non-moral factors, each of which can be shared with other animals; you do not have to assume that morality is sui generis.


"The Responsibility of the Scientist", Physics Education in University, 1998-3, pp.4-8, The Physical Society of Japan, Nov. 1998.

The problems of the social responsibility of the scientist became a subject of public debate after the World War II in Japan, thanks to the activities and publications of Yukawa and Tomonaga. And such authors as J. Karaki, M.Taketani, Y. Murakami, and S. Fujinaga continued discussion in their books. However, many people seem to be still unaware of the most important source of these problems. As I see it, one of the most important treatments of these problems was the Franck Report (June 11, 1945) submitted to the US government by James Franck (chairman) toward the end of the war. This Report contains many important ideas and suggestions as regards the responsibility of the scientist, the morality of the use of atomic bombs, the prospective nuclear armaments race, and the possibility of international control of nuclear power. However, I should like to concentrate only on the first topic in this paper.

Why did Franck and his committee at Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago feel the urgent need for writing and submitting this Report? According to the Report,

in the past, scientists could disclaim direct responsibility for the use to which mankind had put their disinterested discoveries. We cannot take the same attitude now because the success which we have achieved in the development of nuclear power is fraught with infinitely greater dangers than were all the inventions of the past. (I. Preamble)

This passage seems to contain the crux of our problem: These scientists clearly recognize the "new" responsibility for them, and the ground of this responsibility is also clear enough; i.e., when a new scientific discovery or invention turns out to have grave bearings on human interests, the scientists who became aware of that are responsible for notifying people of this and advise to look for suitable means for avoiding prospective dangers.

In the rest of the paper, I elaborate the reasoning behind the preceding passage, and confirm that basically the same idea and reasoning has been repeated and developed in Russell-Einstein Manifesto (1955), by Pugwash Conferences (first in 1957), by Tomogana, and by Rotblat (the long-time Secretary of Pugwash, who received the Nobel Peace Prize together with the Conference in 1995). Revised text [Japanese]; English text.

From the Origin of Morality to the Evolutionary Ethics, part II: Reductionism in the Normative Ethics, Tetsugaku-kenkyu No.567, April 1999.

In this part II, we aim at constructing a reductionistic theory of normative ethics, drawing on the results of part I, in the spirit of the Darwinian theory on the origin of morality. First, I wish to make clear what I mean by "reductionism" in normative ethics. (1) It is concerned with the nature of moral values or moral norms, and it asserts that these can be reduced to non-moral values and other conditions. (2) It does not assert that moral values or norms can be reduced to factual statements; we regard the distinction between description and prescription as basic, and norms and values belong to the latter. (3) And it aims at showing not only that moral values can be reduced to non-moral values, but also how that reduction can be accomplished.

Our reductionism tries to depend on scientific theories and findings on human nature on the one hand, and tries to avoid any assumptions which appeal to special or irreducible character of morality, on the other. Thus the Kantian position which characterizes moral values by referring to Reason's Freedom and distinguishes them from satisfaction of mere preferences, is clearly contrary to our reductionism. But what are the merits of reductionism in normative ethics? First, it is compatible with scientific and empirical findings about human nature, and it can directly appeal to what we feel and experience; non-reductionism either places morality beyond the realm of our empirical knowledge, or separates morality from our animal nature. Secondly, as a consequence of the first, we can construct a normative theory, on reductionism, in terms of such factors as appearing in our actual deliberation or decision in practical matters: preferences, feelings, or inclinations together with some other conditions. Since the Darwinian account of morality does not need any super-natural elements, normative ethics should not appeal to any such, either. And thirdly, reductionism on the basis of our preferences (including our tendencies to aim at personal ideals or emotional tendencies) can easily connect normative ethics with what we actually do, and provide motivations for our behavior; normative ethics which lacks this connection is useless and pointless.

As a preliminary analysis, we examine some of the characterizations of morality in moral philosophy (such as Baier's or Hare's), and point out that there is a considerable gap between these and what we actually observe in our 'moral behavior or discourse'; the gap mainly consists in the normative elements in the philosopher's characterization, and the philosopher often requires too much universality for morality. However, the mere presence of normative elements does not make reductionism impossible; reductionism fails only if we are forced to assume moral norms which cannot be reduced to non-moral values. Thus our preliminary analysis suggests the following tasks for reductionism: (1) we have to ascertain the gap between our morality as it is and morality as it ought to be; and (2) we have to analyze the basic factors and normative judgments contained in the latter; further, (3) we have to show how these judgments can be justified; and finally, (4) we have to show that these factors, as well as the basis of the justification, are reducible to non-moral factors and conditions.

13. Normative Ethics and Reductionism

14. Why Reductionism?

15. What is Morality?

16. Need for Behavioral Principles

17. Morality and Universalizability

18. Considerations for Everyone's Good

19. The Universalizability and the Equality of Good

20. The Problems for Reductionism

(To be continued.)

Full text (Japanese)

Sherlock Holmes and Probabilistic Induction (Online essay)

In this paper, (1) I argue that Sherlock Holmes was a good logician according to the standard of his day, and (2) I try to show what his method of reasoning was. Now, (2) is a harder task than (1), because we have to identify the essential features of his method of reasoning. In order to show this, I have not only to examine what Holmes says he is doing, but also to look at the methods of scientific reasoning recommended by several distinguished philosophers of science in the 19th century. I want to examine Holmes's method of reasoning in a historical setting; and this has something to do with the philosophy of science in the 19th century, and hopefully with the philosophy of science today. I will examine whether such methods are similar or dissimilar to Holmes's method. Logicians and philosophers I wish to examine are, John Herschel, John Stuart Mill, William Whewell, Augustus de Morgan, and William Stanley Jevons; however, since the space is limited, I cannot do justice to all of them.

My conclusion is this: Sherlock Holmes was distinctly different from Herschel or Mill or Whewell who may be called a classical methodologist; but he was very close to de Morgan or Jevons who were an advocate of the new symbolic logic and the probabilistic theory of induction. But what is the point of showing all this? The rise and development of statistical method in the19th century had a great impact on the theories of scientific reasoning, and de Morgan's or Jevons's theory is a newer theory of induction in this century. And such a change of methodology is clearly reflected in the popular stories of Sherlock Holmes, which were written in the late 19th century and early 20th century.


From the Origin of Morality to the Evolutionary Ethics, part I: Reductionism in the Descriptive Ethics, Tetsugaku-kenkyu No.566, pp.17-47, October 1998

Darwin's account for the origin of morality in The Descent of Man is still valuable; because he has provided a key concept for sound reductionism, or the "dangerous idea" as Daniel Dennett puts it. I will reconstruct Darwin's argument in response to J.G.Shurman's criticisms in The Ethical Import of Darwinism (1887). Shurman's most cogent criticism is that Darwin presents a mere imaginary psychology instead of an evolutionary account for the morality; and that Darwin's argument seems plausible because he assumed our moral experience when he tries to explain the genesis of moral feelings in a non-moral but intelligent animal.

However, it is perfectly possible to interpret Darwin's "imaginary psychology" in terms of contemporary evolutionary theory; and I will show this in terms of the behavioral strategies of "ticks-picker" borrowed from Dawkins. This bird is supposed to be social and intelligent; and with this suppostion, it is possible that a "conditionally altruistic" strategy prevails among its members, according to natural selection. Moreover, it is quite natural to suppose that such a strategy is supported by psychological make-up, which is exactly what Darwin tried to show. Thus "moral feelings" can evolve together with "altruistic" strategies; thus Darwin's reductionism with respect to morality can be maintained.

This theoretical reconstruction can be suported by such recent results in primatology as de Waal's observations. Further, we can see that recent development of evolutionary psychology is still within the scope of Darwin's original idea.

1. Darwin's Dangerous Idea?

2. Shurman's Criticisms of Darwin

3. Ethics as Science

4. Understanding Darwinism

5. Biological Utility and Human Utility

6. Origin of Moral Sense or Conscience

7. What does Darwin seek?

8. How to make Sense of Darwin's Imaginary Psychology

9. Behavioral Strategies for "Ticks-picker"

10. What if Social and Intelligent?

11. Evidence from Behavioral Ecology

12. Evolutionary Psychology

Full text (Japanese)

Darwinism and Ethics, Seibutsu-kagaku 50-2, pp. 80-96, Sept. 1998

In this paper I wish to clarify the relationships between Darwinism (as a scientific theory) and ethics.

I wil review the 19th century discussion on this matter, from Darwin to Huxley (from section 1 to section 8); and then I will examine the contemporary attempt at drawing "the moral implications" from Darwinism by J. Rachels (from section 9 to section 11). Finally, I will present my own view in the last part (from section 12 to section 15).

1. Notorious evolutionary ethics?

2. Descriptive ethics, metaethics, and normative ethics

3. Darwin's early considerations

4. Darwin's mature view

5. Science and ethics in Darwin

6. Spencer's evolutionary ethics

7. Conciliation of egoism and altruism

8. Huxley's Evolution and Ethics

9. The moral implications of Darwinism?

10. Darwinism undermines the human dignity?

11. What is a "good reason"?

12. How we should justify a prescriptive judgment

13. A way to the justification of ethical judgments (1)

14. A way to the justification of ethical judgments (2)

15. Why we should be moral

Full text (Japanese)

"Expository Essay: Laplace and the Philosophy of Probability," Philosophical Essay on Probabilities (Japanese translation by S.Uchii), pp.207-284, Iwanami, 1997.

1. Laplace's Activities: An Overview
2. Determinism, Enlightenment, and Probability
3. Deterministic World View
4. Laplace on Enlightenment
5. The Place of Probabilities
6. The Role of Probabilities in Scientific Inquiries
7. The Principles of Probabilities
8. Deterministic Causes and Statistical Causes
9. Degrees of Prediction, Prior Probabilities, and Posterior Probabilities
10. Inductive Probability vs. Statistical Probability
11. The Law of Large Numbers
12. Probability and Betting Ratio
13. Probability and Practical Rationality
14. Errors and Best Measurements
15. Statistical Estimates, Statistical Decisions
16. Laplace on Statistical Probabilities
17. The "Objectivity" of Statistical Probabilities
18. Laplace on Scientific Method
19. Epilogue

"The Origins of Morality", Science Journal Kagaku 67-4, pp.297-304. April 1997.

Darwin's consideration in The Descent of Man on the origins of morality seems to be on the right track. His view is well supported by many results of the contemporary animal ecology, and it clarifies the elements which constitute morality. Employing Frans de Waal's recent contributions, I will discuss what the evolutionary considerations suggest on the origins of morality.

Ethics and Theories of Evolution, vi + 235pp. Sekaishiso-sha, Kyoto: May 1996.

Does science have any relevance to ethical value judgments? This book tries to give an answer to this question focusing on the theories of evolution.
In Part One, Darwin's considerations on the origins of morality in The Descent of Man are analyzed, in order to know the overall characters of the evolutionary view of man. His considerations cover, at least in a rudimentary form, almost all problems discussed in recent sociobiology and animal ecology. Moreover, he gives us many important ideas for constructing ethics in the light of the evolutionary view of man.
In Part Two, we examine the ethical considerations in the late 19th century centering on evolution, mainly focusing on H.Spencer's "evolutionary ethics" and T.H.Huxley's view on the matter which makes a sharp contrast to Spencer's. And in the course of this examination, the question of the relevance of evolutionary view to ethics receives closer considerations. Although neither Spencer nor Huxley gave us a promising clue to the question, we can learn from their mistakes, as well as from their useful ideas.
In Part Three, we will briefly review the basic ideas of recent sociobiology which tries to incorporate newer results of evolutionary investigations into our overall picture of man. Some sociobiologists try to resurrect "evolutionary ethics" in a newer form; and we will criticize M. Ruse's view in particular. Although we can find several important analogies between the Darwinian theory of evolution and the empiricist theory of ethics such as Ruse's, Ruse has completely failed when it comes to the justification of ethical judgments. Drawing on recent results of ethics such as R.M.Hare's theory, we will show how the evolutionary considerations can be incorporated into ethics, without committing any "naturalistic fallacies". We will sketch how ethical judgments can be justified, based on facts and logic, and how factual insights provided by evolutionary theories can be incorporated, thereby not making any logical mistake of "deriving Ought from Is" and keeping the prescriptive force of Ought.

pdf version (2008), New

"Chaos, Complexity, and Methodology," Journal of the Philosophy of Science Society, Japan, 28, pp. 17-29. November 1995.

The philosophical implications of "chaos" cannot be grasped without clear understanding of such concepts as "determinism", "non-linearity", and "predictability". Beginning with Laplace's classical statement of determinism and predictability, I will sketch Maxwell's and Poincar?s modifications of the statement and their awareness of the significance of non-linearity. Then I will briefly touch upon what may be suggested by the study of chaos for clarification of the notion of complexity; and, finally, contend that the computation for the study of chaos can be regarded as a kind of inductive basis, which provides the affinity of mathematics and natural sciences, on the one hand, and the continuity of traditional sciences and studies on chaotic systems, on the other.

"The Probabilistic Revolution, or the Penetration of Probabilistic Ideas into Science," Arche 3, pp. 1-12. June 1995.

The concept of probability is indispensable in the contemporary science. It appeas not only in many specific fields of science but also in the general characterization of scientific method in the philosophy of science. However, we have to notice that such a probabilistic characterization of scientific method came to be known only in the 19th century; this was a natural result of a wide use of probabilistic or statistical method which appeared in the 18th century. In this paper, I will illustrate some of the most conspicuous problems raised by introducing the probabilistic concepts into physics, specifically, the kinetic theory of gases.

Introduction to Philosophy of Science---Methods of Science, Aims of Science, vi + 278pp. Sekaishiso-sha, Kyoto: May 1995.

What is science, what are the distinctive features of science? Philosophy of science tries to give an answer to these questions in the light of general and specific results of actual science. Beginning with the considerations on the relationship between science and philosophy, the following topics are discussed in the process of examining possible candiates for answering the preceding questions:

Chapter 1 Science and Philosophy

1.1 Two senses of 'philosophy of science'/1.2 The basic question of philosophy of science/1.3 Changing physics/1.4 Another view of science/1.5 Scientific thinking and philosophical thinking/1.6 Descartes's method/1.7 In view of historically changing science/1.8 Divisions of philosophy of science, main problems

Chapter 2 Methods of Natural Science

2.1 Introduction/2.2 Bacon's Induction, Newton's Rules/2.3 Induction and hypothesis/2.4 Context of discovery and context of justification/2.5 Herschel on hypothetico-deductive method/2.6 Mill on induction and hypothesis/2.7 Whewell's view on induction/2.8 Explication of conceptions/2.9 Colligation of facts by means of a concept/2.10 Verification and the consilience of inductions/2.11 Formal laws and physical laws/2.12 Probability and induction/2.13 The development of probability theory and statistical methods, up to Laplace/2.14 Laplace's classical theory of probability/2.15 Traditional induction and probabilistic induction/2.16 Changing views on scientific method/2.17 Maxwell on statistical method/2.18 Summary of induction and hypothesis

Chapter 3 Falsificationism

3.1 Introduction/3.2 Can we justify induction?/3.3 Probabilistic induction and induction by enumeration/3.4 Reichenbach's vindication of induction/3.5 Falisifiability, deductivism, and demarcation/3.6 Criteria for choosing hypotheses/3.7 Distinction between induction and corroboration/3.8 Falsification of probabilistic hypotheses/3.9 The problem of auxiliary hypotheses/3.10 Falsification of the main theory or auxiliary hypotheses?/3.11 Difficulties of falsificationism/3.12 Falsificationism and the methodology of research program

Chapter 4 Scientific Explanations

4.1 Introduction and preview/4.2 Causal explanations/4.3 Explanations by subsuming under a regularity/4.4 Explanations by unification/4.5 Three types of explanation: Mill's clasification/4.6 Hempel's classification of explanation/4.7 Statistical explanations in Mendelian genetics/4.8 Counterexamples against Hempel's models/4.9 Problems of statistical explanations/4.10 Historical changes of 'explanation'/4.11 Teleological explanations/4.12 Summary: what matters in scientific explanation

Chapter 5 Theories, Observations, and Measurements

5.1 Introduction/5.2 Observations in the ancient astronomy/5.3 Quantitative data of measurements/5.4 Phenomena/5.5 Regularities in phenomena/5.6 Handling of irregularities and the development of the theory/5.7 The Copernican astronomy: saving the phenomana, or describing the world?/5.8 Is instrumentalistic interpretation unfair?/5.9 Are 'symmetry' and 'harmony' a matter of taste?/5.10 Promising theory or established theory?/5.11 Getting back to the main question: do observations depend on a theory?/5.12 The kinetic theory of gases/5.13 Measurements and theoretical concepts/5.14 Tentative conclusions

Chapter 6 Formation and Confirmation of Hypotheses

6.1 Introduction/6.2 'Logic of discovery' in mathematics/6.3 Discovery of groups and patterns/6.4 Discovery and induction in experimental science/6.6 Logic of confirmation and the 'raven paradox'/6.7 The axioms of probability and some theorems/6.8 Bayes's theorm/6.9 Confirmation of statistical hypotheses/6.10 Empirical probability and inductive probability/6.11 Subjective factors in induction/6.12 Prior probability and the guess of a group/6.13 Extension to the confirmation of non-statistical hypotheses/6.14 Interpretations of probability: the two aspects of probability/6.15 Classical interpretation/6.16 Frequency theory/6.17 Propensity interpretation/6.18 Subjective theory/6.19 Logical interpretation/6.20 Summary of the interpretations/6.21 Hypothetical characters of induction

Chapter 7 Theory Change

7.1 Introduction: Continuity and Gap/7.2 Ambiguities of 'paradigm'/7.3 Kuhn's radical contentions/7.4 General difficulties with Kuhn/7.5 Kuhn's criteria for theory appraisals/7.6 Phases of subjectivity in theory appraisals/7.7 The Bayesian looks at the paradigm doctrine/7.8 What can the Bayesian learn from Kuhn?

Chapter 8 Aims of Science

8.1 What are the distinctive features of science?/8.2 Science as it is/8.3 The aims of scientific theories/8.4 Explain the success of science?/8.5 van Fraassen's constructive empiricism/8.6 Observability and the aims of science/8.7 The cognitive and pragmatic aspects of theory-acceptance/8.8 Conclusions

Bibliography and Index

"British Philosophers on Scientific Explanation in the 19th Century", Journal of the Philosophy of Science Society, Japan, 26, pp. 67-79. November 1993.

Recent discussions of the problem of scientific explanation seldom refer back to the literature before Hempel & Oppenheim's famous paper (1948). In this paper, I wish to pay some attention to the British philosophers's treatments of the same problem in the 19th century. The causal view of explanation can be found in J. F.W.Herschel and J.S.Mill, the unification view in W.Whewell. And Mill attemted the classification of the types of explanation, and tried to incorporate Whewell's ideas into his empiricist view.

"Darwin and Wallace on the The Principle of Divergence," Memoir of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, 32, pp. 43-103, March 1993.

The circumstances which led to the Darwin-Wallace "joint paper" at the Linnean Society (1858) are closely studied by a number of scholars. However, those who charges Darwin's side with unfair moves pay little attention to the real originality of Darwin's work, while those who defend Darwin's side are mostly unfair to Wallace's contributions. We need an appraisal fair to both of them.
In this paper, I will point out the essential difference between Darwin's theory and Wallace's theory, as they stand in 1858: while both had the principle of natural selection, Darwin was trying to formulate another supplementary, but crucially important, principle, called "the principle of divergence", for explaining the existence of large differences among different species. For Wallace, this feature was a rather direct consequence from the principle of natural selection and (occasional) environmental changes. But Darwin saw that something else was necessary, because he believed that each species may change even where the environment does not change; so that he asked: how does a species multiply its members even if the environment remains the same? The key concept was the "diversified places in the polity of nature"; that is, even if the physical environment is the same, there can be many different ecological niches within it, and if a variety of a species can find another niche different from the original one, the same species can multiply its members by occupying plural niches. However, for this, that variety must acquire (in general) a quite different character from the original species.

Thus Darwin's principle of divergence can be analyzed into the following three components:
(D1) Any species can increase its members by occupying a new niche (even within the same physical environment). ----This is an independent principle from that of natural selection.
(D2) Any species can adapt to new niches by acquiring diversified characters. ----This is one of the general consequences from (D1) and the natural selection, provided the plausible assumption that diversified characters are necessary in order to utilize different niches.
(D3) Given a niche and competitors within the same niche, a species with the optimal characters is selected; which means all species with intermediate characters are eventually eliminated. ----This is the final conclusion Darwin wanted to obtain from (D1) and the natural selection.

(c) Soshichi Uchii, Last modified: Fe . 6, 2018.