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5. Social Responsibilities of Scientists
Since I do not want to end my series of lectures without any unity, let me change the topic of the fourth lecture. Originally I inteded to give a survey of recent trends in Japan; but this seems to me uninteresting, so that I will pick up a problem which can be discussed by any view I have surveyed, and see what sorts of agreement and difference may appear among them.
Since the "new philosophy of science" lay an emphasis on the social character of science, let me pick up the question of social responsibilities of scientists as the common problem. Murakami published a book on it in 1994; Taketani also published one in 1982. And since the logical empiricism does not exist (at least in the original form) any more, I will try to reconstruct what it might say on this problem, drawing on some remarks of several older supporters.
Junzo Karaki's Unfinished Book
Murakami begins his book by a review of the last, unfinished book of Junzo Karaki (1904-1980): Notes on the Social Responsibilities of Scientists (1980). Karaki studied philosophy with Kitaro Nishida in Kyoto University; then spent more than ten years as a school teacher, and turned to literary criticism. After the war, he taught at Meiji University, and studied the Japanese literature, mainly of the middle ages. So let me begin with Karaki's assertions.
He was stimulated by the statement of the first Pugwash Conference* by scientists held in Canada in 1957. As Karaki understands, the statement contains the following two important messages: (1) Science develops when it is free from any dogmatism from outside, and we have to defend this freedom; but (2) since science can bring about evil results to mankind, such as a nuclear war, we have to endeavor as much as possible to prevent such results. The former defends the freedom of the scientist as such, and the latter imposes social responsibilities on the scientist in view of the actual threat of nuclear weapons. And Karaki feels very uneasy about this dualism.
*The first conference was held in a small town with the name "Pugwash" of Nova Scotia, Canada, hence this name. From Japan, three physicists, including Yukawa, attended. For more recent conferences see: http://www.pugwash.org/
The Pugwash Conference was held as a sequel of Russell-Einstein Manifesto in 1955. As you may well know, Einstein wrote a letter (1939) to President Roosevelt, and he urged to begin a project for making an atomic bomb, because he feared Hitler's Germany might make it ahead of the Allies----this is the common strory about the beginning of the "Manhattan Project" (actually, the story is longer and more complicated, but the details are not important here). Many first-rate scientists were gathered together for this "Manhattan Project", Robert Oppenheimer being nominated to the director, and the bomb was successfully made in July 1945. And Hiroshima was smashed on August 6, Nagasaki on August 9. Einstein is said to have felt deep remorse for his role (although he never touched on this project). Russell-Einstein Manifesto was a sincere appeal to the world that we should not use nuclear weapons, and we should find a peaceful method for resolving conflicts between countries.*
Now, Karaki tries to point out one big difference between Russell-Einstein Manifesto and the statement of Pugwash Conference. According to Karaki, Menifesto was an urgent declaration of Russell and Einstein as "members of the species Man", disregarding whether or not they are a scientist, a British man, or a Jewish man; whereas the Pugwash statement sticks to the standpoint of the scientist as scientist. Karaki does not like this limitation. Why? Because, as Karaki sees the matter, Einstein threw away his position as a scientist, and went back to the position of a man with no qualification, presumably because of his remorse about the atomic bomb; and Karaki presumably sympathizes with this. Karaki wants to accuse not only the nuclear weapon but science or physics itself, because the nuclear weapon was produced by science.
Because Karaki thinks this way, the dualism of Pugwash statement seems to him to leave a grave ambiguity. And Karaki wishes to accuse the optimism in the defence of freedom of science, because he does not recognize any piece of remorse, any feeling of guilt, in that defence. Karaki is saying that, if a scientist speaks of his social responsibilities, he has to profess his own guiltiness as a scientist. And he went one step further. He examined Yukawa's writings and behavior in comparison with Tomonaga's writings and behavior*; and his conclusion was that while Tomogana has the feeling of guiltiness, Yukawa doesn't; therefore Yukawa must be condemned!
*Shin'ichiro Tomonaga (1906-1979) , another graduate of Kyoto University, received a Nobel Prize in 1965 as a second Japanese.
I have tried to reconstruct what Karaki wishes to say as briefly as possible, but as sympathetically as possible, at the same time. Still, you may notice many gaps of logic here and there. For instance, even if we grant that physics has produced the atomic bomb, it also has produced many other useful things; then why should every physicist feel guilty about the atomic bomb? And, granting Karaki's allegation (which is dubious, to say the least) for argument, why does the feeling of guiltiness make Tomonaga a better man (or physicist?) than Yukawa? Is Karaki ready to extend his accusation to any science which can bring about evil? For instance, wrong economics may bring about a depression, which is an evil; and therefore economists should be all blamed? Even philosophy may produce evil, because some philosophers of Kyoto School were sympathetic with the military government which certainly produced many evils in China and south-east Asia; then should all philosophers confess guiltiness for their possible crimes? What about Karaki himself, what did he do during the war?
I do not mean to push these questions here. But I should like to point out at least this: most subscribers (see the text on the web) of Russell-Einstein Manifesto are winners of Nobel Prize, including Yukawa. Why do we, or Russell and Einstein, need such names? If a man or a woman appeals to the world his or her own conviction, why does that person wish to attach signatures of eminent scientists? Karaki never touches on this question.
But Karaki's book had an impact on many people, including some physicists. Anyway, in order to clarify the problem to which Karaki addressed himself, we need some philosophy of science. We have to see the connotation of "science", we have to determine, or at least sketch what science is; otherwise we cannot meaningfully talk about the responsibility of a scientist as such. We have to distinguish this from the social responsibilities of any person as a man, as a carpenter, or as a businessman.
[to be continued .....]
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(c) Soshichi Uchii, April 13, 1998; last modified April 19, 2006.
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