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Taketani's Response

Taketani quickly responded, because he was severely criticized by Karaki in the book. You may recall that Taketani did reseach on atomic bomb during the war. Moreover, he published a paper after the war in which he explicitly defended the scientists who were involved in Manhattan Project. Let me quote some passage:

The defeat of the war may be seen that, in view of the atomic bomb, the scientists in the world worked together, and expelled the barbarism from the world. And we must say, Japanese scientists also participated in this, so long as they were working for the development of mankind regarding science as man's treasure. If there is a Japanese who condemns the atomic bomb as against humanism, he must be regarded as showing his intention to cover up his own anti-humanism. In order to complete the project for the atomic bomb, almost all scientists against Fascism cooperated eagerly. They are, in the main, enthusiastic supporters of humanism. .....(Taketani, The Social Responsibilities of Scientists, 51-52)

This looks indeed very offensive, to say the least. Imagine you had relatives killed in Hiroshima or Nagasaki; then would you accept Taketani's presumptuous judgement that "people (now including you) who condemn the atomic bomb as against humanism" are wrong and "cover up your own anti-humanism"?

If you cannot (unfortunately) imagine how you would feel if you were in such a position, I can give you a relatively mild example. Shigeru Huzinaga, a Japanese physicist who taught for a long time in Canada published a fine book on Robert Oppenheimer* two years ago; and in this book, he tells us his own experience in the United States when he was a student in the University of Chicago; he has a brother who experienced the atomic bomb in Nagasaki. When he was waiting for a bus in a cold morning (in 1959), a middle-aged gentleman (presumably a professor) kindly picked him up, and during the ride he asked Huzinaga's opinion about the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While Huzinaga was mumbling, the man disclosed his own opinion: "Japanese intellectual people, like you, must have been looking foward to the fall of the military govenment; our two bombs marvelously did the job. So I think you Japanese people must be feeling that you are freed by the atomic bombs. Am I right?" Huzinaga was dead struck, but fortunately the car got to the campus, and Huzinaga fled out of the car! (Huzinaga, Robert Oppenheimer, Asahi-shinbun-sha, 1996, 4-5).

*Robert Oppenheimer (1904-1967) was the Director of the many first-rate scientists at Los Alamos where they succeeded in making the atomic bomb. However, knowing the results in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he felt guilty; and later he objected against the project of hydrogen bombs. Later again (December, 1953), he was expelled from all public offices, because of the alleged espionage for Soviet Union. Notice that the United States was in the midst of "McCarthyism" (Joseph R. McCarthy, 1908-1957, Senator) at that time. From 1947, Oppenheimer worked as the Director of the Institute of Advanced Studies, Princeton, for 19 years. Oppenheimer invited Yukawa and Tomonaga to the Institute.

Now, as it stands, Taketani's opinion seems as insensitive and presumptuous as Huzinaga's middle-aged gentleman. And Karaki was furious; Karaki accuses Taketani as having no feeling of guiltiness as a nuclear physicist.

However, we have to be fair to Taketani. In his Social Responsibilities of Scientists (Keiso-shobo, 1982), Taketani answered Karaki as follows.

During the war, Taketani was aware that America might use the atomic bomb; but he was under arrest and could do nothing but to appeal to a prosecutor; Taketani now thinks that Japan would have surrendered even without the two atomic bombs, but he still thinks that the barbarism of the military govenment was so persistent that only the atomic bombs could smash it. And Japanese people were responsible for the invasive war; Taketani wished to assert that this crime cannot be canceled by the atomic bombs (p. 6).

And in the Chapter 1 of the book, Taketani tries to spell out what he want to say in more detail. We have to understand the dual meaning of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (1) First, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the terminal point of the second world war, and Japanese people were responsible for inviting them. (2) Second, Hiroshima and Nagasaki may be regarded as a starting point for future wars that may lead to the extinction of humans. If you forget (1), the significance of (2) may become obscure. Einstein was concerned about (2), but he was also aware of (1), Taketani says.

Taketani on the Role of Scientist

Such replies as this certainly alleviate the initial offensive impression. In addition, I should mention that Taketani also contributed to the considerations for using atomic energy for peaceful purposes (The Three Principles for Atomic Energy). However, Taketani's reply still leaves the question whether the scientists cooperated for making the atomic bomb were "humanistic", whether or not they are accountable for what they have done, as a scientist.

Taketani touches on this question now and then in his book. For instance, against Karaki's worry that the development of science may go against the progress of civilization or humanity, Taketani says as follows. "How we use the results of science depends on social decisions, and scientists alone cannot decide. They lack economical basis in the first place, and so the decisions and realization must be done by people or the government" (p.114). Thus Taketani criticizes Karaki that Karaki tries to attribute everything to scientists.

Again, Taketani defends the duality of (1) the freedom of scientific research for truth and (2) the moral or social constraints on the technological application of such a truth. As for (1), the scientist is completely responsible as scientist; but for (2), it is not primarily the business of the scientist, but that of corporations, government, or engineers based on the needs of society.

According to Taketani, presumably the most important responsibility of the scientist is to look forward what the consequences may be if such and such are used in a certain way. Since this is the business most suitable for the scientist, the scientist is responsible for teaching that to the society (p.151).

Since the role of the scientist is of this limited nature, Taketani argues that Karaki's complaint misses the point. Karaki says that Pugwash statement can be understood as stating that for the scientist reseach is first and endeavor to establish peace is second; Taketani answers to this, nothing is wrong with that! If the scientist does everything, he is a dictator, not a scientist.

What about Logical Empiricism?

It seems to me that most logical empiricists will agree with Taketani's view, as far as the scientist's role is concerned. Whether or not the aim of science is a search for truths, there is no agreement among the logical empiricists; some say yes, and some other prefer other answers, such as Mach's, that science aims at a simple and economical system of thoughts which can save all phenomena. But despite this difference, they generally agree that we should distinguish practical problems from epistemic problems. In order to decide what to do, or what we ought to do, we need scientific knowledge in many cases; but we need more. We have to decide what we want, or what we prefer, and this is a value-judgement science as such cannot give. Given what we (ultimately) want, science can give us an advice with respect to suitable means for realizing our aim, what we want.

For example, let me quote Carl Hempel's view ("Science and Human Values", in Aspects of Scientific Explanation, the Free Press, 1965, pp.81-96). He was one of the most active members of logical empiricism. He is not as emotional as Karaki, but he is also aware of the following sort of problems:

The control of nuclear fission has brought us not only the comforting prospect of a vast new reservoir of energy, but also the constant threat of the atom bomb and of grave damage, to the present and to future generations, from the radioactive by-products of the fission process, even in its peaceful uses. And the very progress in biological and medical knowledge and technology which has so strikingly reduced infacnt mortality and increased man's life expectancy in large aereas of our globe has significantly contributed to the threat of "population explosion", the rapid growth of the earth's population which we are facing today, and which, again, is a matter of grave concern to all those who have the welfare of future generations at heart.

Now, what shall we do, or what ought we to do, with these problems? Hempel points out that "a moment's reflection shows that the problems that need to be dealt with are not straightforward technological questions but intricate complexes of technological and moral issues." Notice that Karaki failed to analyze the nature of problems even to this extent. Karaki immediately brings the question of "guilt" (why does this comes in? It's hard to tell!) into the problem, and never sees other ways to approach the problem.

Then Hempel raises his fundamental question: Can such valuational questions be answered by means of the objective methods of empirical science, which have been so successful in giving us reliable, and often practically applicable, knowledge of our world? In order to tackle this question, he first reviews the process of scientific testing: hypothetico-deductive method for validating a scientific hypothesis. Scientific hypotheses are often hard to test directly by observations; so we draw some concrete consequences from those hypotheses, and check whether these in fact hold in the world; if they do, we test the hypotheses further, in a similar way. Although these results cannot give a definitive proof, we accept a hypothesis if it passes enough number of tests. Sometimes a hypothesis, or even an "established" theory may be abandoned in view of new results incompatible with its predictions. The "reliability" of scientific knowldge essentially depends on such tests and validation. Now how can this be related to the question of value-judgement?

Hempel first treats the case of "instrumental judgments of value"; Is a certain course of action good or bad, right or wrong? Take a case of education, for instance. Is it good to raise children permissively, or in a restrictive manner, saying "do this, don't do that, and follow whatever I say"? Let's agree (for the sake of argument) that experimental research established that the restrictive way tends to generate resentment and agressive character in children, wheras the permissive way tends to avoid such results and to enable children to enjoy their potentialities. Then doesn't this research show that the permissive way is right, or that it is at least better than the restrictive way? Hempel says "No":

A moment's reflection shows that this is not so. What would have been established is rather a conditional statement; namely, that if our children are to become happy, emotionally secure, creative individuals rather than guilt-ridden and troubled sould then it is better to raise them in a permissive than in a restrictive fashon. A statement like this represents a relative, or instrumental, judgment of value. Generally, a relative judgment of value states that a certain kind of action, M, is good (or that it is better than a given alternative M') if a specified goal G is to be attained; or more accurately, that M is good, or appropriate, for the attainment of goal G. (pp.84-5)

As Hempel clearly points out, a relative judgment of value is nothing but a restatement of objective means-end relation between a certain course of action and a goal or end such as G. Because of this character, a relative judgment of value is an empirical statement capable of scientific test. However, this does not solve the fundamental question, whether the goal G ought to be pursued. Hempel names this sort of question "categorical judgment of value". Hempel admits that such a categorical judgment of value is not susceptible of empirical support like that of a relative judgment of value. Then what can we do?

Hempel's answer is clear. It is we who has to make the decision: "it is we who would have to committ ourselves to an unconditional judgment of value" by singling out one of the sets of consequences as superior to its alternatives. Of course we cannot expect perfect knowledge about the world when we have to decide how to act.

Our decisions must therefore always be made on the basis of incomplete information, a state which enables us to anticipate the consequences of alternative choices at best with probability. Science can render an indispensable service by providing us with increasingly extensive and reliable information relevant to our purpose; but again it remains for us to evaluate the various probable sets of consequences of the alternative choices under consideration. (p.89)

I quoted at length from Hempel, because I wish to show the clearness of his analysis, even if the overall tenets are approximately the same as Taketani's assertions. When we have to deal with grave and difficult problems, such as those Karaki raised, what is important is not the emotional commitment such as Karaki's, but the analysis of the problem as clear and as cool as the case admits of. Hempel's analysis may be insufficient, but it certainly shows the standard we have to clear; both Karaki and Taketani are short of that. Hempel still leaves the big question of how we should make such decisions or evaluations. But his analysis already gives a good clue to the question I raised against Karaki: Why do Russell and Einstein need signatures of many eminent scientists, for their Manifesto? What is the significance of this?

My answer is as follows: Their signatures indicate that those scientists essentially agree with Russell and Einstein on the importance of the problem they are addressing themselves, and agree also on the factual basis (predictions and estimates) of their proposals. Most of these scientists are experts of nuclear physics, and know far better than anyone else about the nature of nuclear energy; their career shows their views deserve attention of all scientists. Thus although there remain some uncertainties, we have to make decisions as quickly as possible, before the feared disaster may begin. That's the significance of their signatures.*

*Let me quote the relevant part of Russell-Einstein Manifesto:

It is stated on very good authority that a bomb can now be manufactured which will be 2,500 times as powerful as that which destroyed Hiroshima. Such a bomb, if exploded near the ground or under water, sends radio-active particles into the upper air. They sink gradually and reach the surface of the earth in the form of a deadly dust or rain. It was this dust which infected the Japanese fishermen and their catch of fish. No one knows how widely such lethal radio-active particles might be diffused, but the best authorities are unanimous in saying that a war with H-bombs might possibly put an end to the human race. It is feared that if many H-bombs are used there will be universal death, sudden only for a minority, but for the majority a slow torture of disease and disintegration.

Here, one of the scientific reasons for their fear is specifically stated. The relevance of scientific authority should be clear.

Many warnings have been uttered by eminent men of science and by authorities in military strategy. None of them will say that the worst results are certain. What they do say is that these results are possible, and no one can be sure that they will not be realized. We have not yet found that the views of experts on this question depend in any degree upon their politics or prejudices. They depend only, so far as our researches have revealed, upon the extent of the particular expert's knowledge. We have found that the men who know most are the most gloomy.

Again, the relevance of best available knowledge is appealed. In addition, the neutrality of the views of expert with respect to politics is strongly suggested.

I am aware that there might be other political or ideological factors in their Manifesto; for instance, Russell sometimes explicitly denouced Soviet Union, even went as far as saying that we should destroy them. But the agreement of many eminent scholars of various nationalities may be quite effective for eliminating such doubts or possibilities. And I think we may reasonably infer that these scientists are trying to discharge one of their responsibilities as a scientist, as a winner of Nobel Prize. If Karaki examined the writings of Yukawa and Tomonaga, he should have noticed this, instead of looking for the evidence of "guiltiness"; but presumably Karaki missed the mark even from the beginning.

Karaki is angry at Yukawa, because he finds Yukawa often showing great enjoyments in his scientific activities! But here, Karaki is manifestly irrational and foolish; I just cannot believe that some readers should find any significance about such remarks. Think of himself. Why does Karaki study Japanese literature of the middle ages? Because it is fun for him to do, because he finds great enjoyments. And the same can be said about myself, or about any scholars; I study philosophy of science because it is so much interesting for me, although teaching is sometimes painful! What's wrong with that? And if all physicists do their research with sincere feelings of guiltiness, is that any better than the research with a great enjoyment? Let's stop talking about this nonsense.

Summary

Now, although Hempel left the question of "categorical judgment of value", and Taketani likewise left similar questions for "society" or "people", both can treat the problem of the responsibility of the scientist (as scientist) at least to this extent: A scientist is a specialist of knowledge in his specific field of study; so that he knows things better than others in this field, and when necessary, he can and should provide his knowledge and opinions. That, at least, belongs to his responsibility as a scientist. And in this light, we can understand the significance of the role of eleven people (9 are winners of Nobel Prize) who signed the Russell-Einstein Mnifesto. Whether some felt the feeling of guilt (like Einstein) may add an extra weight to this Manifesto, but it does not seem to be relevant to the question of responsibility.

The plausibility of this view can be tested by the following Gedanken- experiment. Suppose, instead of 9 scientists, 9 businessmen, like Carnegie or Rockfeller, signed the Manifesto; then Marxist philosophers like Taketani would not approve of this, despite the same literal content! Suppose, again, 9 anti-communist scientists signed the Manifesto; this time again, Taketani would denounce it as an anti-communism campaign! This way, the role of scientist as scientist may become clearer.

What is Responsibility? [Added in April 22]

Although the preceding answer may not be water-tight, it can serve pretty well for our considerations of the social responsibilities of the scientist. So, next, I wish to contrast this answer to Murakami's considerations. But before that, I wish to add one important point which may be overlooked by many people. When we talk about the responsibility of someone, we tend to forget that we are ourselves making a certain value-judgment. So it may be useful to analyze, in the spirit of the Hempelian analysis, what we intend to assert by our judgment of responsibility.

Suppose a professor was so absent-minded that he forgot to give a lecture today, and 30 students wasted almost one hour. They will accuse the professor by saying that he was irresponsible, or that he was responsible for his failure to give a lecture. Now what do they mean? First, it is pretty clear that they will committ themselves to the following sort of judgments:

(1) The professor ought not to forget his duty;

(2) he ought to have given the lecture;

(3) he ought to apologize to the students for his failure, etc.

Thus the judgment of responsibility implies or contains these ought-judgments. But how do they try to justify these ought-judgments? They will certainly appeal to the duty of a professor; according to our common and public understanding, a professor is supposed to have teaching obligations, and he ought not to skip his lectures unless there are some unavaoidable accidents or reasons; that's his or her duty, and the question is usually settled right here.

However, since the latter statement of duty of a professor is itself a value-judgment, we can still ask why we have to accept that. Hempel's analysis suggested that there are two kinds of judgment of value: instrumental and categorical. Now, to which kind does the statement of duty belong? Offhand, the answer is "both". For, it is generally agreed that various kinds of duty for human life are for the benefit of a human society and its members, and this presupposes a categorical judgment of value; and at the same time, we have to consider what is a good means or the best means for such categorical values, and the judgment of duty refers, at least implicitly, to such instrumental judgements.

Now, this much agreed, what I should like to emphasize is that such instrumental judgments of value change, depending on the situations and our state of knolwdge, even if the presupposed judgments of categorical value are the same. Suppose, for the sake of argument, it was generally accepted that punctual and serious professors tend to promote the benefit of the society by their contributions through education. But, suppose again, that this general opinion turned out to be false, because absent-mindedness accompanied by an intense research on a very important problem far outweighs the benefit from punctual and serious education. Then, the judgment of duty may change, because it is a mixture of both kinds of judgment of value. I am not saying that the professor's neglect of his teaching duty is praiseworthy, but merely suggesting that it may become excusable because of the greater benefit produced by an intensive reseach accompanying his absent-mindedness. This means that the judgment of duty may allow exceptions, needs qualifications, and the judgment itself may change in a long term. The judgment of duty is not absolute; it has to be reconciled with many other judgments of the same sort. This is the point.

Let's forget about the trivial example of the duty of a professor, and let's turn our attention to the duty of the scientist as scientist. But we should keep in mind the last point. Even if the categorical judgment of value, underlying the justification of science, remains the same, the duty and the responsibility of the scientist as scientist may change, if the change of situations surrounding the scientist affect the judgment of instrumental value.

[to be continued .....]

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(c) Soshichi Uchii, revised, April 22, 1998; last modified April 19, 2006.

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