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Ichii meets Taketani

Among the Japanese advocates of logical empiricism, Saburo Ichii sometimes collaborated with Taketani, and wrote several papers criticizing Taketani's theory of the Three Stages; Ichii's criticism was based on his critical examinations of Hegelian dialectic logic (The source of the following exposition is Ichii's book Philosophical Analysis, Iwanami, 1963). Thus in the late 50's and early 60's, there was a real confrontation between the Maxist philosophy of science and the logical empiricism in Japan. In the Anglo-American world, probably the best known criticism of dialectic is that of Karl Popper (1902-1994) in his paper "What is Dialectic?" (first published in Mind, N.S. 49, 1949; reprinted in Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963). Ichii's papers seem to be written without knowing Popper's this paper, because there are no reference to it; this seems to me very strange, because he studied with Popper, at least for some period.

Anyway, let us see what Ichii says. Ichii first tries to exploit some common features between Taketani's philosophy and logical empiricism. According to Ichii, both despise mere dependence on papers, and try to face the actual science and its concrete history; although Taketani lays emphasis on a global considerations of history, whereas logical empiricism gives more weight to logical analysis. Then Ichii cites Herbert Feigl's view which distinguishes four levels of scientific explanation: (1) the level of descriptions, (2) the level of empirical laws, (3) the level of first order theories, and (4) the level ofsecond order theories. Ichii interprets that (1) and (2) together roughly correspond to Taketani's phenomenological stage. Moreover, Feigl characterizes (3) and (4) as follows:

It is on this theoretical level . . . that we gain a "real insight into the nature of things" . . .. What we give on this level are interpretations concerning the structure of light, of matter, of electricity, etc. The constructs of this theoretical level usually concern the micro-structure of the observed macro-phenomena, i.e., they involve existential assumptions (atom, electron, photon-hypotheses) or constructs of the abstract mathematical order (energy, entropy, tensors, probability functions, etc.). [H.Feigl, "Some Remarks on the Meaning of Scientific Explanation", Readings in Philosophical Analysis (ed. by H.Feigl and W.Sellers), Appleton Century Crofts, 1949, 512.]

Ichii asserts that 'existential assumptions' roughly correspond to Taketani's stage of substance-theory, and 'constructs of the abstract and mathematical order' to the stage of essence-theory; thus, at least to this extent, the philosophy of logical empiricism and Taketani's theory may approach to each other. But of course there are differences as well. First of all, according to the Three Stage Theory, the essence-theory in a certain period may be construed as an element of the new phenomenological stage, thus making a spiral development anew; but nothing of this sort in Feigl's theory. Thus Taketani may argue that the empiricist's theory is inadequate in that it can see the development of science as a gradual and somehow homegeneous process; it cannot give a good guide for scientific inquiries.

Ichii concedes that this reply may have some point; but counters as follows: if there should be some such good guide for scientific inquiries as that Taketani imagines, it would be better to have it; but Taketani's criticism applies to his own theory too, because a mere generalization such as his own theory has obvious limitations, and for any specific inquiry or case we cannot obtain any effective guide for inquiry without a close examination and analysis of the case itself. Feigl realizes this no less than Taketani.

My Defence of Ichii's Position

I think Ichii's reply is on the right track, and I wish to strengthen that. In the first place, we have to distinguish (1) generalizations about past development of science, from (2) practical guide for scientific inquiries; (1) may be obtained from historical studies, but by itself it does not give a prescription as regards how science should be done, whereas (2) clearly needs such prescriptions.

Now, what does Taketani wish to give by his theory of the Three Stages? He is not always clear, but it seems he is primarily after (2), in view of his criticism of Mach's "idealism" quoted above; he said, in effect, that Mach's philosophy is no help for doing nuclear physics, but his theory of the Three Stages based on dialectic materialism does help in order to resolve the difficulties in it. I am very skeptical about his claim, but let's grant that for argument. Still, it does not follow that other proposals such as Feigl's (interpreted as giving a practical guide for doing science) are therefore useless.

I have already pointed out that Yukawa's theorizing (1935) had nothing to do with Taketani's theory or with dialectic materialism. It is true that Taketani collaborated with Yukawa sometimes, but again this does not prove anything about the usefulness of Taketani's theory*; it merely shows that Taketani was an able man as a physicist. To put it bluntly, a fool with Taketani's theory is no superior to a clever physicist, however strictly the fool may follow its instructions! Almost everything depends on concrete situations and the abilities of the inquirer.

*Yukawa's paper (1935) appeared after Taketani was graduated from Kyoto University. Taketani was impressed by this paper, and began to visit Yukawa's laboratory in Osaka University; Shoichi Sakata (another able physicist) was an assistant there, and these three began to collaborate. The person who expressly acknowledged the usefulness of Taketani's theory of the three stages was Sakata. But we have to distinguish Sakata's personal inspiration from the usefulness of Taketani's theory as a methodology. In order to assert the latter, Taketani's theory must have a far wider effect.

Again, let me remind you of this. We do not do philosophy of science in order to become a better scientist, any more than the philosophers of mathematics do their job in order to obtain a famous prize of mathematics! Philosophers are after a better understanding of the nature of science or mathematics; that's precisely what Mach was after, as a philosopher. Well, you may ask "what is that for?"; my answer is that it is for satisfying our curiosity as a philosopher. Scientists ususlly pursue solutions for specific problems, whereas philosophers are interested in the nature of scientific knowledge in general, knowledge that solves, in specific cases, the scientists' problems. These two kinds of interests sometimes intermingle, because a scientist may have philosophical interests as well, and vice versa for a philosopher; Mach was exactly that type of philosopher-scientist, and he was well aware of this.

Sometimes, philosophy may have some effect on building a new theory, especially when we need conceptual analysis or conceptual reformation, as was the case for the formation of relativity theory. But let me point out that Einstein said that he was somehow influenced by Mach's criticisms of the Newtonian concept of absolute motion in the absolute space and time, not by Hegelian dialectic or by the Marxist dialectic materialism. Thus, even if we grant Taketani's claim, a similar claim can be made for other philosophical positions and other methodologies.*

*[Added: April 9] I wish to add here the following remark, which is suggested by Prof. Humitaka Sato's brief review of the theory of elementary particles (Science and Happiness, Iwanami, ch.3, 1995).

When Yukawa wrote his paper, only the following particles were known or assumed: proton, neutron, electron, and neutrino (in addition, photon is known, but this is irrelevant here). And there must be some forces which connect them (the contemporary physics teaches that there are four kinds of interactions and forces, i.e., (1) strong, (2) weak, (3) electromagnetic, and (4) gravitational). E.Fermi in 1934 tried to explain ｰﾋ-disintegration (protons or neutrons in a nucleus change, by emitting electrons or neutrionos, into a more stable state of the nucleus), but this was insufficient. Thus Yukawa, utilizing Heisenberg's and Fermi's ideas, introduced the strong interaction and a new particle (200 times) heavier than the electron. This opened a new line of reseach of nuclear physics which tries to find further particles for explaining other problems; and E.O.Lawrence had already invented the Cyclotron (1930) for finding experimental evidence for this sort of research. Sato calls this type of research "Yukawa-Lawrence Type"; it aims to be expansive.

On the other hand, there is another type of reseach which tries to construct mathematical theories for the laws of such interactions, and this aims to unify many phenomena by finding a common law. The guiding principle of this type is parsimony; and Sato names this type "Einstein-Dirac Type". In this connection, there is an interesting episode about Yukawa; when Niels Bohr visited Japan in 1937, Yukawa explained his theory of meson to him, but Bohr didn't like it; Bohr thought that explaining a problem by assuming a new particle was too easy. In this episode, Bohr seems to take sides with the Einstein-Dirac Type. And Mach's emphasis on the economy of thought is also quite close to this.

Now, the point I wish to add is that, as Prof. Sato pointed out, which of these two Types will succeed depends on the state of progress of the field in question. Taketani's criticism of Mach or Bohr (The Problems of Dialectic, pp.27-29) seems to be unfair, in view of this. I know that Taketani will surely claim that his theory can take this into consideration; but I will argue that such a claim looks plausible only at the cost of the ambiguities and wide margins his theory inherently leaves (see below).

In the second place, even if we take the alternative interpretation (1) for Taketani's theory, i.e. as an empirical generalization of how science actually develops, it is awfully too vague to admit of an empirical or historical justification. For instance, those two examples I mentioned before as an illustration of Taketani's three stages can be interpreted in various ways, depending on what you understand by "phenomenon", "substance", and "essence". Let us consider the development of astronomy up to the Newtonian mechanics. Take Copernicus, for instance. Taketani would agree that the astronomy before Copernicus, the geocentric theory, was at the phenomenological stage. But even the advocates of the geocentric theory admitted many entities which make up the universe, in addition to those observable phenomena such as the apparent movement of stars, of the sun, and of the planets; and are these entities "substance" in Taketani's sense, or are they not? And when Copernicus came, he certainly brought in a novel feature in astronomy; he reversed, in a way, the role of the earth and the sun; but he never introduced extra entities. The question is, how does Taketani treat this innovation? Did Copernicus make a step toward the stage of substance-theory? If so, why? If not, why, again (Ichii raises simlar questions with respect to Boltzmann's theories of statistical mechanics and of electro-magnetism)? Taketani leaves all these details wide open.*

*In Taketani's 1942 paper " The Formation of the Newtonian Mechanics" (The Problems of Dialectic, Keiso-shobo, 1968, pp.80-95), Taketani says that Copernicus proposed his heliocentric theory against the geocentric theory and introduced the "substantive" solar system (p.88). By this, presumably Taketani means that Copernicus intended that his theory describes the real or true solar system, and therefore Copernicus advanced astronomy one step toward the stage of substance-theory. But I don't see how this latter assertion can be justified, because most supporters of the geocentric theory must have believed also that their theory captured at least some truth of the universe. Why does the mere reversal of the sun and the earth, with no other new entities, make an essential difference with respect to the "substantiveness" of a theory?

If what Taketani means is merely that Copernicus theory is true(or closer to the truth), this does not seem to be relevant to the question of whether a theory belongs to the phenomenological stage or to the stage of substance-theory; for there should appear many theories, incompatible with each other, in either stage, and at most one can be true. The question at issue is not the truth, but to which stage a theory belongs.

That's why Taketani's theory seems to have some plausibility; because if a seeming counterexample appears, he can fill in details in such a way that he can save his theory. If a different example appears, he can fill in details as he likes in another way, etc.

In the third place, even if we may pass over the problems about the concepts "phenomena", "substance", and "essence", it is very hard to know how we should make sense of Taketani's assertion that the "essence" at one level becomes a "phenomenon" at a new and higher level.

For a traditional empiricist, a phenomenon is an observable event such as a star's apparent motion, a collision of two balls, or the generation of heat under certain circumstances. Sometimes one may include generalized facts, such as that a heated metal rod generally becomes longer, or all swans are white, or Hook's law holds within certain limitations for most kinds of materials. These are called empirical generalizations, or, if formulated more precisely, experimental laws. Phenomena in this sense are all closely connected with our observation, including observation by means of technical instruments.

But according to Taketani, the law of universal gravitation, one of the essences of the Newtonian mechanics, becomes a "phenomenon" for a new inquiry, leading to the general relativity theory of Einstein, for instance. It seems to me that this makes sense only as a metaphor, and it would be far better if we can find another, more precise way of expression.* And it is quite easy to find one, if we are willing to abandon the terminology of dialectic. For instance, like this: although Newton's theory was highly successful, it had a conceptual difficulty of assuming "action at a distance", and a number of problems, which are difficult to explain within it, accumulated; so some people began to look for an alternative theory, which means that the law of universal gravitation was then regarded as subject to revision, and even subject to explanation (Newton refused to give an explanation). According to this locution, the phenomena to be explained are the same before and after the decline of the Newtonian mechanics; but theories change, and one theory fails to explain all the phenomena, whereas another succeeds in it. This way, we can avoid the use of the words "phenomena" and "essence" in such an ambiguous way as Taketani recommends.

*This way of looking at the development of scientific inquiry is not quite original to Taketani. John Herschel presented a similar view in 1830, although he put the matter within the terminology of causality, instead of dialectic materialism (which was non-existent at that time!). Let me quote Herschel's remarks:

As particular inductions and laws of the first degree of generality are obtained from the consideration of individual facts, so Theories result from a consideration of these laws, and of the proximate causes brought into view in the previous process, regarded all together as constituting a new set of phenomena, the creatures of reason rather than of sense, and each representing under general language innumerable particular facts. In raising these higher inductions, therefore, more scope is given to the exercise of pure reason than in slowly grouping out our first result. (Italics mine; A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, 1830, 190 [Johnson Reprint, 1966])

I think Herschel's way of putting the matter is permissible, because his language clearly suggests that this is a metaphor (As A is to B, C is to D). But Taketani adheres to dialectic, so that an old essence comes back to a new phenomenon at a higher level somehow literally. It is quite hard to make sense of this, and Taketani is responsible for explaining this; otherwise he is no better than those philosophers of Kyoto School who utter unintelligible words.

[to be continued .....]

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(c)Soshichi Uchii, April 3, 1998; last modified April 19, 2006.

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