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The Duties of the Scientist
Let us review our argument so far. If we are to talk about the social responsibilities of the scientist, we have to identify the role of the scientist as scientist. The scientist is certainly within a "social web" so to speak, and various duties are incumbent on the scientist; but we wish to know the duties of the scientist, not as a professor, not as a father, but as the scientist. We have tentatively adopted the view that the scientist is a specialist of knowledge, in a specific field such as physics or biology. Then, are there any norms of the scientist as such (qua scientist), when the scientist is concerned with research or publication in the chosen field? Certainly there are.
As regards the standard of the scientific evaluation of hypotheses and theories, Kuhn and most logical empiricists are largely in agreement, although there are some differences of emphasis. And I think this standard provides the basis of the duties of the scientist. Let us see. Kuhn in his paper "Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice" (Essential Tensions, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1977) mentions five criteria for a good scientific theory:
(1) A theory should be accurate; its consequences should be in agreement with empirical data.
(2) A theory should be consistent; it should not contain a contradiction in itself, and it must be compatible with other related theories.
(3) A theory should have a broad scope; it should be applicable not only to the original problems but to a wider domain.
(4) A theory should be simple; it should organize individually isolated phenomena into a simple whole.
(5) A theory should be fruitful; it should disclose new phenomena or new relationships among phenemena.
Thus Kuhn enumerates five kinds of value for a scientific theory. These values may be called "epistemic values", because scientific theories are primarily concerned with knowledge, not with matters of practical decisions or what we ought to do in our social life. Thus although Kuhn and we use the word "value", its meaning is limited to this narrow sense, and this sense implies neither usual moral values nor economic utilities; Marxist philosophers, logical empiricists, and most advocates of the "new" philosophy of science can all agree on this point. Then you may ask why these five criteria can be the basis for the duties of the scientist. My answer is going to be given in several steps, as follows (I am aware that there may well be other criteria for scientific research, but for the sake of simplicity, I will concentrate on these five).
(1) Epistemic values instrumental for knowledge
Some traditional philosophers say that science aims at truth; other philosophers say science aims at a neat systematization of our experience, and people like Kuhn say science aims at problem-solving. But whichever standpoint you take, you have to admit that the preceding five criteria are important. Why? Because, we have learned from experience, or from the history of science, that theories satisfying these criteria generally worked well, in explaining or predicting many phenomena. That's the reason, in a nutshell, why we accept these epistemic criteria. Now, the scientist, a specialist of knowledge, must depend on these criteria, as long as he is concerned with his research; if he brings in too much of his personal preferences and neglects these criteria, he is likely to fail as a scientist. In a word, these criteria can serve as a means for obtaining objective knowledge. Or in the Hempelian terminology, these five criteria are an instrumental judgment of value for knowledge, and in this case the presupposed judgment of value is something like "knowlege is good" or "knowledge ought to be obtained" (the latter is not a judgment of epistemic value, but a judgment of social, moral, or personal value, shared by most of us; but this may need further justification in terms of more basic values, such as the welfare of people).
(2) Epistemic values constrain the scientist
Next, since the scientist is a specialist of knowledge, he is generally constrained by these epistemic values, as the scientist. The circumstance is quite similar to a physician, for example; a physician is supposed to cure a patient, and the physician is bound by certain standard instrumental for this purpose of cure. You may now ask: "How do the epistemic values constraint the behavior of the scientist?" My answer is: "By guiding the scientist's choice of theories or hypotheses, or, indirectly, by guiding his research programs." For instance, if his proposed hypothesis is not as accurate as the case requires, he has to abandon it and look for another. If he finds out that his hypothesis violates one of the fundamental laws of an accepted theory, consistency requires him to abandon the hypothesis, etc., etc.
Again, it may be asked whether the epistemic values can be applied to technological researches. Although I do not have enough space to discuss the whole problem, the answer seems to be basically "yes", since engineering cannot dispense with epistemic problems: Given a problem of designing a certain device with such and such ends, what is a solution? Of course, engineering has to face another sort of problems such as cost and novelties, so that the epistemic values alone should be insufficient. But I will disregard such problems of technology here.
Anyway, if the epistemic values work as a constraint, they already have one of the essential features of a norm. And our evaluation of a scientist as scientist depends on this sort of values and norms. For instance, if a scientist produces many theories or hypotheses (i.e. papers presenting such theories), he may be regarded as a good scientist, a good specialist in the field; if another person's work contains many inaccuracies, some inconsisitencies, and turns out unfruitful, that person is bound to get a disreputation.
(3) Moral standard for the scientist
Moreover, we gradually form a moral standard for evaluating a scientist. Notice that even in the Ancient Greece, intelligence and knowledge are one of the constituents of human virtues. If you have a good deal of exact knowledge, or good abilities for acquiring such knowledge, people will give you credit for that, and that is a sort of virtue (in Greek sense). However, since knowledge and abilities for acquiring knowledge is one of the goods for humans, other considerations may outweigh them. For instance, excellent knowledge combined with an evil personality may increase the amount of evil; knowledge obtained by unfair method (e.g. by stealing other person's ideas) must be condemned. Here, of course, usual considerations for morality come in. But even here, the epistemic values play an important role. For instance, why is it to be accused that a scientist change his data in order to get better fit for his hypothesis? Because this is against the value (norm) of accuracy! And in addition, this is a kind of "lie", extending that ordinary notion to science; given what science is about, many important moral concepts can be extended to science, and that's one of the nice things about our morality! Murakami seems to have overlooked this.
Again, why is it wrong to get money from the government for your "unpromising" project for research, by emphasizing its importance by rhetoric, rather than by evidence? Because unfruitful theories are not good (epistemically), and it is against the standard of science; therefore, it is shameful (morally) to cling to such theories and use dirty rhetoric. The epistemic values appear every now and then in this sort of reasoning.
In this respect, it seems to me that the scientist is no different from the lawyer or the physician or the carpenter. Our social life needs many kinds of specialists; and these specialists have their own specific duties attached to their speciality. The lawyer is supposed to know legal matters better than anyone else; the carpenter is supposed to be good at building or mending houses. And because of their specialities, they owe us a certain kind of duty, if we pay them in order to ask their help. Many kinds of moral duties are of this sort.
Well, you may ask "who pays the scientist?" In our complex contemporary society, the answer may be hard to give, but a general answer is "our society"; and this needs qualification depending on specific cases. If you are a professor in a science school of a governmental university, the government pays and since this money comes from the tax, people of your country pay for your research and education. If you are a researcher in a private institution such as Hitachi, the company pays you and you owe certain duties to the company; but such duties certainly include the duties as a scientist, in addition to the general duties as an employee; you are expected to do a different job from a secretary's!
Thus, I think, Murakami's analysis that a scientist has a responsibility only to his scientific community, is wrong. My abstract statement that a scientist is within a "social web" has such specific contents as briefly described above, if applied to a specific case; whereas Murakami's abstract statement that a scientist belongs to a scientific community works only in the context of a "peer review" of the scientist's professional work, and that is only a part of the "social web".
(4) Specific rights and duties of the scientist as scientist
I can even enumerate some of the most important rights and duties of the scientist as scientist, and relate them to the five criteria for a good theory. However, first, let us consider the general question of freedom of research (this is a right) Murakami already discussed. It seems to me obvious that this right of the scientist is a rather direct collorary from the general freedom of thought, expression, publication, and behaviour. It is well known that John Stuart Mill defended such freedom on a utilitarian ground; he argued, given certain qualifications, it is generally conducive to our social welfare to defend such freedom as a right to any grown-up person in a typical modern society, as long as such freedom does not cause harm to other people. Mill's argument is based on his empirical assumption about means-end relation, that allowing such freedom is a good means for producing more satisfaction among people, and of course people like satisfaction rather than dissatisfaction. The validity of this assumption must be established by empirical investigations.
Now, applying his argument to the scientist's case, it is farely obvious that the same holds with the same qualifications; the scientist is that kind of person who finds a great pleasure in acquiring new knowledge, and as long as his research does not produce harm to other people, the scientist has a right of free research. Of course, the question Karaki or Murakami raised is: "What should we do if some grave harm is expected from such freedom?" But this question can be answered, in principle, on the same ground as that has established the freedom itself; and this belongs to a most usual form of ethical questions. All you have to take into consideration is the role of the scientist, and the specific features of a research in question. Surely the case of atomic bomb falls into this category. Molecular biologists gathered for the Asilomar conference also faced such problems; and they were not irresponsible, but neither were the physicists gathered for the Pugwash conferences. I don't think Murakami's allegation, that the latter was "political" whereas the former was "new and epoch-making", can be justified.
Thus, the right of free research accompanies a correlate duty to inform people of the danger of research, if there be any. And I should emphasize that this is a rather straightfoward application of usual ethics to the scientist. As I have already suggested, even if the categorical judgment of value remains the same, instrumental judgments of value may change, because of new situations, new knowledge, and the development of new technologies. In such a changed situation, it is often foolish to cling to the old instrumental judgment of value, such as the unqualified freedom of research; and the rights and duties of the scientist may well change. To make the matter more concrete, let me quote from Joseph Rotblat's speech when he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995*:
From my earliest days I had a passion for science. But science, the exercise of the supreme power of the human intellect, was always linked in my mind with benefit to people. I saw science as being in harmony with humanity. I did not imagine that the second half of my life would be spent on efforts to avert a mortal danger to humanity created by science.
* Rotblat was born in Poland. He joined the Los Alamos team as a member of British scientists. But when he knew Hitler's Germany was defeated, he left Los Alamos and went back to England (1944). He worked as the Secretary of the Pugwash conferences for 17 years. For his whole speech, click here.
Thus, he is clearly suggesting that he has changed his judgment about science as a means for human welfare. In the speech, he is appealing to fellow scientists to share his judgment and to behave accordingly (as well as to the nuclear powers and to fellow citizens).
Next, let us turn to more specific questions. The virtue or duty of intellectual honesty is usually praised for the scientist. Obviously, this virtue or duty is closely connected with the epistemic values of accuracy and consistency. Because of these epistemic values, the scientist is required to have such virtue or duty. When Murakami accused scientists doing dirty tricks, he was implicitly appealing to this duty, derived from the epistemic values; and my point is that the latter is the basis for such a duty.
Then what about the right of priority? Again, this is a fairly obvious application of ethics (of property) and the epistemic value of fruitfulness. If you find a beautiful object which does not belong to anyone yet, it is yours, it becomes your property. The institution of science extends this rule to intellectual findings; this is basically the ground of priority. Since science aims to find new knowledge, such a rule is useful for its aim, giving incentives to the scientist. Thus the epistemic value of fruitfulness underlies this right; and if someone steals other's findings or ideas, it is a violation of this right, and the scientist has the duty of not violating this right. When Murakami accused plagiarism, he was again appealing to this ethical duty derived from the epistemic value.
We have not so far mentioned the epistemic values of broad scope and simplicity. Are there any duties related with these? Duties may be hard to find, but certainly the rightness or justifiability of scientific evaluations are based on them; thus the fairness, for instance, of a referee's evaluation must be judged by reference to such values. And the fairness in evaluation of one's colleagues (as a scientist) is an important ethical requirement, isn't it? That's one of the reasons why we assign several referees for any paper; this may alleviate the influence of personal preferences; and of course, a mere layman cannot judge such epistemic values as the broad scope or the simplicity.
Thus, although the list is far from exhaustive, we can relate the duties or norms of the scientist to the epistemic values for the scientist. And if you wish to discuss the responsibility of the scientist, this is the way the discussion goes. That is the point I wish to raise against Murakami's view. Notice that, although I appealed to ethics sometimes, the basic line of my argument is quite close to Hempel's view; I tried to do that way.
THE END
Thanks for your attention!
(c) Soshichi Uchii, revised May 3, 1998; last modified April 19, 2006.
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