Section 5
Universalizability and the Concept of Good
Let us get back to Sidgwick's Principles. In addition to the Principle of Justice, Sidgwick mentioned two other, i.e. the Principles of Prudence and of Rational Benevolence; and he claimed that none of them are tautologous. Whereas Hare seems to have derived, in effect, in his Moral Thinking (1981) by means of the logic (the prescriptivity and universalizability of an evaluative judgement) and the facts of the case in question what these Principles have accomplished; thus leading to his version of utilitarianism. But as we have already seen in the last section, the strong universalizability (Hare clearly subscribes to this) is not tautologous (analytic) and has some substantive content, and in this respect Sidgwick was right. This raises a strong doubt about the validity of Hare's 'derivation' of his own version of utilitarianism. But we will first examine Sidgwick's view.
To begin with, why does Sidgwick need two more Principles in order to give the basis of utilitarianism? Let me quote one of the relevant passages from The Methods of Ethics (Sidgwick 1907) at length, because this is very important:
The principle just discussed, which seems to be more or less clearly implied in the common notion of 'fairness' or 'equity', is obtained by considering the similarity of the individuals that make up a Logical Whole or Genus. There are others, no less important, which emerge in the consideration of the similar parts of a Mathematical or Quantitative Whole. Such a Whole is presented in the common notion of the Good----or, as is sometimes said, 'good on the whole'----of any individual human being. (380-1)
Sidgwick is first trying to explain why the Principle of Justice (roughly, the strong universalizability of 'ought') is not tautologous. His reason is not quite clear, but he seems to be suggesting that, although it is logically possible to treat differently different individuals making up a Logical Whole (humans, in this case), our reason dictates to treat them similarly, if their situations are similar; and that this dictate is self-evident, although it is non-tautologous. Then, Sidgwick turns his attention to another kind of Whole (called Mathematical or Quantitative Whole), and points out that one's Good on the Whole is such a Quantitative Whole. He then continues:
The proposition 'that one ought to aim at one's own good' is sometimes given as the maxim of Rational Self-love or Prudence: but as so stated it does not clearly avoid tautology; since we may define 'good' as 'what one ought to aim at.' If, however, we say 'one's good on the whole', the addition suggests a principle which, when explicitly stated, is, at any rate, not tautological. (381)
It should be clear that Sidgwick is carefully trying to avoid a tautologous principle. And recall that the Principle of Prudence is stated as: "Hereafter as such is to be regarded neither less nor more than Now". This prescribes how we ought to treat different parts of one's good on the whole; and Sidgwick is pointing out that the last notion is not a Logical Whole but a Quantitative Whole. Many readers may be puzzled by this distinction; is 'good' so different from 'ought' or 'right'? Yes, it is, and I will explain the difference on behalf of Sidgwick (judicious Schneewind 1977 is not of much help on this point; see 298-300).
Whether or not an act is right, whether or not you ought to do it, is a two-valued distinction; there is no middle-road option, such as 'this act is a-half right', so that it is not a quantitative distinction which allows a difference of degree. And Sidgwick is saying, in the Principle of Justice, that such a distinction should equally apply to any two individuals similar in the relevant respect. On the other hand, whether something is good for me is clearly a matter of degree, 'good' being essentially a matter of comparison; moreover, Sidgwick is committed to the view that one's good on the whole must be composed of one's particular good experienced at each moment. Sidgwick distinguishes 'ultimate good' from 'good as a means' and he is talking here about the former. By introducing the notion of 'one's good on the whole', Sidgwick is drawing our attention to the relation of parts to the whole and the relation of parts to other parts. Notice that such a relation brings in new problems which do not arise in the rightness of an action: how should one compare one good to another, and how should one reflect the comparative value of one good into the value of the whole good?
This problem is quite independent from the (strong) universalizability of 'ought' or rightness. To see this, you need only to imagine the following sort of cases: Suppose you assign a higher value to any of your particular goods according to the closeness of them to the present moment, now. Although this is quite contrary to the Principle of Prudence, this choice (conceived as an action) can satisfy the universalizability, as long as you continue to prescribe consistently the same choice to yourself (in earlier and later moments) and others: 'Since this choice is right for me now, it is right for me at other moments, and for anyone at any moment' (notice that 'now' in this judgment can be expressed by a universally quantified time variable). Of course such a choice makes the determination of the value of good on the whole awfully difficult (if possible at all, and you may need another principle for summation); but again, this has nothing to do with the universalizability of rightness.
For the sake of comparison, let us examine the same problem from Hare's standpoint. Hare applies the universalizability to goodness (and to any other evaluative concept). But we have to be careful not to overestimate the extent of its application, in view of Sidgwick's analysis. For a while we will ignore the distinction between 'ultimate good, or good in itself' from 'good as a means', since this distinction is not central in Hare. Now, if I say
(1) this is a good philosophy book,
I am committed to
(2) any philosophy book similar to this in the relevant respect is good,
according to the (strong) universalizability; although I think the (strong) universalizability applied to goodness is still non-tautologous if 'the relevant respect' is taken to be universal, I shall ignore this point. Now, if 'good' is a comparative notion (no one will deny this), and if it is further a quantitative notion (comparability does not necessarily imply this, because a mere ordering is insufficient for producing a measure of goodness), the universalizability is quite incompetent to impose any restriction on such a comparison or a quantitative measure.
Soppose I wish to make a ranking list of philosophy books I have ever read. Does (2) impose any restriction on such a ranking? Yes, it does, but very little. For, whatever criterion I may be adopting for evaluating philosophy books, (2) implies merely that if the same criterion is satisfied, I have to call a book 'good'; it does not teach where I should insert that book in my ranking list. If you think (2) can do more, you are implicitly adding something more to the universalizability. For instance, it may be supposed that the criterion for the evaluation does provide a clue how to grade a philosophy book; but the universalizability merely says 'the same condition, the same grade', and does not tell anything about how I shoud grade-----this already presupposes a sort of comparative or quantitative notion of goodness. Thus, it seems this consideration confirms Sidgwick's distinction. Any criterion of goodness, since 'good' is a comparative or often quantitative notion, must refer to a method of ordering or grading, in addition to specifying the relevant respects for evaluation. 'Ought' and 'right' need only the latter.
Hare may be able to bring in preferences for laying down a criterion of comparison of goodness or a (quantitative) measure of goodness. However, it is not clear at all how the (strong) universalizability may help for determining such a criterion based on preferences. In particular, when we have to determine the goodness of a book I read in the past in comparison with another book I read now, the preceding problem of comparing a past good (preference) with a present good (preference) appears in Hare too. That is exactly the reason why he avoided discussing the problem of the 'pure discounting of the future' (i.e., giving less weight to future preferences; see Hare 1981, 100-101). If the universalizability can solve this problem, why didn't Hare do that? And if Hare claims pure discounting is irrational, Hare is not different from Sidgwick.
To 4. The Weak and the Strong Universalizability
To 6. Universalizability and Benevolence
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July 20, 1998. Last modified April 17, 2006. (c) Soshichi Uchii
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